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Introduction
Islamic finance has failed to achieve its most basic and central objec-
tives, but the causes of that failure, and whether anything can be done to
reconstruct the practice in a manner consistent with commercial reality
and its ontology, are matters that, by and large, have gone unexamined. To
understand the nature and depth of the failure, it may be useful to consider
the following three simple examples.
First, a Muslim entrepreneur seeks short-term financing, knowing that
any transaction involving the payment of interest on debt is forbidden
under the rules of the shari'a, defined for purposes of this Article as
Islamic law.' She enters into a contract with an Islamic bank, pursuant to
which the bank purchases a readily fungible commodity and simultane-
ously resells it to the entrepreneur at a mark-up, to be paid in three
months' time. The mark-up corresponds precisely to the prevailing market
interest rate. The bank never retains title to the commodity and the entre-
preneur waives all claims as to breach of warranty against the bank, while
the bank assigns to the entrepreneur all such rights it had against the origi-
nal seller. Immediately upon taking possession of the commodity, the
entrepreneur resells it at market value, leaving her with a sum certain and
an obligation to pay a higher amount in the future. 2
Second, a Muslim airline company wishes to finance the purchase of
an aircraft, again heedful of the Islamic prohibition against interest. An
Islamic bank purchases the aircraft company through an intermediate vehi-
cle funded by the bank's financing and equity contributions. The interme-
diary then exacts from the airline a "lease rate" pegged to the prevailing
market interest rate. The lease is "renewed" semi-annually for a period of
twelve years, and the lease rate re-pegged at the time of renewal. However,
the contract indicates that no party is permitted to withdraw or fail to
1. The basis for this ban is discussed extensively in Section IL.E of this Article.
2. A transaction of this sort, albeit without the final resale back to the original
seller, is described in greater detail in Umar F. Moghul & Arshad A. Ahmed, Contractual
Forms In Islamic Finance Law and Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf v. Symphony Gems N.V. &
Ors.: A First Impression Of Islamic Finance, 27 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 150 (2003).
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renew prior to the expiration of the twelve year period. The lease includes a
provision indicating that New York law governs the transaction.3
Third, a Muslim shopkeeper needs to insure his store against casualty
risks, notwithstanding the alleged shari'a prohibition against insurance.4
Therefore, an Islamic financial institution offers him an alternative;
namely, an allegedly "charitable" instrument whereby he "donates" a set
amount each month corresponding to a premium, which is then kept in his
name at the institution. Other Muslim participants in the scheme offer
similar donations. When a payout to one of the participants becomes nec-
essary due to a qualifying event, the agreements stipulate that the financial
institution withdraws the requisite amount from the aggregate donations
and distributes the funds to the participant in question. The donated
funds are invested in profit making ventures and gains are shared by the
beneficiaries and the financial institution.
The first of these is a particularly egregious example5 of what is
known as a murabaha transaction, which dominates the landscape of
Islamic finance today. Over 80% of the current transactions by volume in
Islamic banks are of a murabaha model. 6 The second example, known as
an ijara transaction, is a newer and rapidly growing segment of the Islamic
financial sector. 7 The third is known as takaful, frequently lauded as an
example of Islamic financial innovation.8
It should also be obvious that all three of these transactions are largely
artificial. They are substantively the same as their forbidden counterparts,
albeit with semantic alterations and higher transaction costs associated
with creating the appearance of difference. "Charitable insurance" is non-
sense, as are simultaneous purchases and re-sales and renewable leases
with no option but to renew. These are awkward constructs to circumvent,
in a fundamentally disingenuous fashion, central prohibitions developed
by the shari'a.
3. For greater exposition on the application of Islamic principles to modern aircraft
finance, see generally Angelo Luigi Rosa, Harmonizing Risk and Religion: The Utility of
Shari'a-Compliant Transaction Structuring in Commercial Aircraft Finance, 13 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 35 (2004).
4. The problem of uncertainty or risk in the structuring of Islamic commercial
transactions, including insurance transactions, is discussed at length in Section II.E.
5. The example I have given involves a procedure known as tawarruq, where the
asset sold and purchased is not only fungible but also resold immediately for its cash
value. This is a somewhat controversial practice that is nonetheless gaining in popular-
ity and is commonly practiced by Islamic banks on the Arabian peninsula. See Mah-
moud El-Gamal, Limits and Dangers of Shari'a Arbitrage 9 (2005) available at http://
www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/files/Arbitrage.pdf. Moghul and Ahmed describe a more
conventional, orthodox murabaha structure, where the asset in question, jewelry, is used
by the effective borrower rather than immediately resold. See Part 1.B.1 infra.
6. See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION,
RISK, AND RETURN 198 (1998).
7. See id. at 144.
8. See id. at 152; see also Ibrahim Warde, The Prophet and The Profits: Islamic
Finance, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sep. 2001, at http://mondediplo.com/2001/09/09
islamicbanking.
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Some argue that legalistic acrobatics of this sort pose no obstacle to
the development of Islamic finance, given literal adherence to the dictates
of the shari'a.9 For example, Frank Vogel and Samuel Hayes, who wrote
one of the most authoritative works on Islamic finance in the English lan-
guage, seem entirely comfortable with the formalisms, fictions and arti-
fices that dominate the practice. They even provide sophisticated
techniques of their own that develop more fully the concepts discussed
above. 10 They assert that Islamic finance has not failed, given that Islamic
commercial vehicles, such as the murabaha, are, on the narrowest technical
grounds, based on profit-sharing that arises from the sale and purchase of
assets. 1 Underlying this is an assumption by Vogel and Hayes that Islamic
commerce, as currently practiced, satisfies broad segments of Muslim soci-
ety that are "socially and politically conservative, seeking individual piety
and social mores built around traditional compliance with fiqh [Islamic
law], and looks to social and political improvements mainly as a result of
that."12
This assumption is incorrect. Vogel and Hayes fundamentally misun-
derstand the cause for the recent explosive growth in Islamic finance and
underestimate its current dilemma in attempting to expand further.
Though the first Islamic banks came into existence little over three decades
ago, Islamic finance has developed into a significant industry with assets in
excess of $200 billion dollars in Islamically-approved financial instru-
ments, operating in over 70 nations and growing at an annual rate of over
20% per year. 1 3 Yet at the root of such growth, frequently expressed as an
article of faith by Muslim advocates of Islamic finance, is the perception
that Islamic commercialism provides a fairer, more just, and more humane
alternative to the alleged brutality of the global marketplace. 14 Respect for
traditional compliance with Islamic rules is not the touchstone; social jus-
tice is.
This perception of substantive fairness and social justice is so wide-
spread and so deep that it is difficult to set forth enough authority in favor
of it to underscore its centrality to modern Islamic finance. Three quite
distinct Islamic figures who were central to the development of Islamic eco-
nomics refer repeatedly to notions of social justice and fairness in their
descriptions of Islamic economics, and in particular Islamic financial
methods. 15 These figures are, without exception, revolutionaries and by
9. See, e.g., IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000).
10. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 235-87.
11. See id. at 137.
12. Id. at 27 n.2.
13. See WARDE, supra note 9, at 1, 75. Malaysia, a nation with a highly developed
Islamic financial system, has alone in excess of $23 billion in Islamic assets, and reports
growth in excess of 42% over the past decade. See Seelen Sakran, The Future of Islamic
Banking, MALAYSIAN BuSINESS, Jan. 15, 2005, at 55.
14. See, e.g., Moghul & Ahmed, supra 2, at 153.
15. See Mahmoud El-Gamal, "Interest" and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law
and Finance, 27 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 108, 115, 120 (2003). Naturally, economics is a far
broader discipline than finance, and the author does not suggest their equivalence.
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no means fit the model described by Vogel and Hayes of political and eco-
nomic conservatives seeking modest social and political improvements
through traditional adherence to the shari'a.16
The first of these, Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, the thoughtful Shi'i Iraqi
jurist who authored a highly influential tome on Islamic economics, as well
as the seminal intellectual contribution to the creation of an interest-free
bank in Islam, makes the point repeatedly in his writings. 17 Sadr's goal
was the establishment of an economic order entirely separate from the pre-
vailing paradigms of capitalism and Marxism. 18 The same can be said for
the militant Sayyid Qutb, whose influence on radical Islamic movements
remains vibrant. 19 Many of Qutb's economic theories appear in a book
entitled Social Justice in Islam.20 His assault on interest is particularly stri-
dent. He describes those who take usury as being without "conscience" or
"ethics.' '2 1 Finally, the highly influential Pakistani Islamist, Sayyed Abulala
Maudoodi, describes taking interest in almost Marxist terms, suggesting
that it increases maldistributions of wealth and perpetuates class strug-
gle.2 2 Maudoodi saw the only solution as being the establishment of what
he termed an "Islamic theo-democracy," hardly the words of a political
conservative. 23
These are by no means the sole contributors to the notion of fairness
and social justice in the context of Islamic finance. Other later, deeply
respected and much less revolutionary figures have said much the same.
However, Islamic notions of finance play an important role in Islamic economics, and
inevitably, proponents of Islamic economics emphasize the fairness of both.
16. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 26.
17. See MUHAMMAD BAQIR AS-SADR, IQTISADUNA 60-65 (World Org. for Islamic Services
trans., 1982) (1969) [hereinafter IQTISADUNA] (describing social justice as one of the
cornerstones of Islamic economics); see also MUHAMMAD BAQIR AS-SADR, AL-BANK AL-LA
RIBAWI Fl 'L-ISLAM 6-7 (1973) [hereinafter AL-BANK] (referring to a form of distributive
justice as being a principal objective of Islamic economics, and to the Islamic bank as
being a key component of the economic system). Though a Shi'i jurist, Sadr's effect on
the world of Islamic finance and Islamic economics in the broader Islamic world has
been significant. Hamid Algar describes Sadr's works as "the most substantial treatment
of social justice in Islam." Hamid Algar, Introduction to SAYYID QUTB, SOCIAl JUSTICE IN
ISLAM 12 (John B. Hardie & Hamid Algar trans., 2000) (1949). See CHIBLI MALLAT, THE
RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 142-43 (1993).
18. See id. at 113-16; see generally IQTISADUNA, supra note 17.
19. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 52 (2002)
(describing Qutb as the "godfather" of contemporary Islamic radicalism); see also Ber-
nard K. Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War, 27 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
299, 348-50 (2003) (describing Qutb's influence). It is important to note that my com-
parison of these three different individuals is in one respect alone-they are all revolut-
ionaries who may be fairly described as the forefathers of Islamic economics and Islamic
finance. See EI-Gamal, supra note 15, at 115.
20. SAYYID QUTB, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN ISLAM 101-42 (John B. Hardie trans., 1953)
(1949).
21. Id. at 107.
22. See SAYYED ABULALA MAUDOODI, ECONOMIC PROBLEM OF MAN AND ITS ISLAMIC SOLU-
TION 27-31 (Abdul Waheed Khan trans., Markaz MaktabaJama'at-e-lslami 2d ed. 1955)
(1947).
23. SAYYED ABULALA MAUDOODI, AL-KHILAFA WA-AL MULK 13-21 (Ahmad Idris trans.,
Daar al-Qalam 1978).
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Muhammad Taqi Usmani, a former judge on the Shari'a Appellate Bench of
the Pakistani Supreme Court, indicates much like Maudoodi that the
charging of interest is partially responsible for the massive wealth dispari-
ties in capitalist societies. 24 Umer Chapra, an economist at the Islamic
Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and one of the most well-
known and prolific advocates oi Islamic finance in the Muslim world,
makes notions of social justice central to his robust defense of Islamic
finance. 25 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, a professor of economics in
Saudi Arabia, opens one of his most well-known books on Islamic econom-
ics with the sentence ". . . the main insight offered by Islamic economics is
that ethics matters, '2 6 and another of his books opens with the sentence
"[b]y prohibiting interest Islam has endeavoured to do away with a hideous
form of tyranny and injustice prevalent in the human society. '2 7 Timur
Kuran, an expert on and critic of Islamic economics, describes the prohibi-
tion of interest as "the most celebrated" injunction in Islamic economics by
proponents of the discipline. 28 Kuran indicates that these proponents
ground the injunction on the principle of fairness.2 9 Ordinary Muslims
are captivated by this perception and are shocked when, in seeking to
obtain Islamic financing, they discover the ruse. 30
Proponents of Islamic finance often repeat the same functional objec-
tives of fairness and social justice, but do not employ appropriate method-
ological techniques to achieve these goals. An altogether different
approach is used, one that claims its origins in the earliest foundations of
Islamic jurisprudence and relies instead on a rigid formalism, in which
public interest and judicial discretion play a very limited role.3 1 Given the
24. See MUHAMMAD TAQ1 USMANI, AN INTRODUCTION To ISLAMIC FINANCE (1998). This
is not a surprise given Usmani's links to the militant party led by Maudoodi. See El-
Gamal, supra note 15, at 115 n.19. However, Usmani served in a high capacity in the
Pakistani courts while Maudoodi was at one point sentenced to death in Pakistan, so it
would be fair to describe Usmani as less militant and revolutionary.
25. See, e.g., M. UMER CHAPRA, TOWARDS A JUST MONETARY SYSTEM (1985).
26. MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, ECONOMICS: AN ISLAMIC APPROACH, at iii (2001).
Siddiqi's critique concerns economic affairs generally, not just merely finance. How-
ever, finance still plays an important role in his analysis. See, e.g., id. at 85-86.
27. See generally MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, BANKING wA ITHOUT INTEREST, at x
(1979).
28. Timur Kuran, On the Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought,
21 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 171, 174 (1989).
29. See id.
30. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 26 n.2. In addition, the author has observed
that many mosques and Muslim institutions in the United States refuse to deposit their
funds in Islamic banks upon realizing the nature of the transactions into which they
would be entering. More than one has called the author in anger and disgust, asking to
be directed to "real" Islamic financial institutions. For a typical Muslim expression of
this perception, as well as the frustrations associated with it, see Tarek El Diwany,
Islamic Banking Isn't Islamic, June, 2003, http://www.islamic-finance.com/itemlOO_f.
htm ("[T]he words 'profit-sharing' are to be heard constantly at all of the conferences [on
Islamic finance]. Some of the scholars, if pressed, will talk about moving towards more
satisfactory products . . . . But then everyone goes home and works on another
murabaha contract.").
31. Whether this type of logic-driven and rigid formalism is inherent to the entire
history of Islamic jurisprudence is a matter much in dispute. See infra Part II.A.
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disparity between the functional ends and the formalist means employed to
reach them, Islamic finance fails to meet the expectations set for it.3 2
Rather than offering any sort of alternative humanistic means of con-
ducting commercial activity, the practice instead has devolved into an
almost random patchwork of rules that are neither cohesive nor coherent.
These inflexible and nondiscretionary rules are artificially forced into a
paradigm to achieve ends for which they provide at best an awkward fit. As
a result, they seem arbitrary and senseless, designed for no purpose and
serving no function other than to complicate already elaborate commercial
transactions. Social justice and avoidance of exploitation play no signifi-
cant role. In Islamic finance, religion largely serves to obfuscate and com-
plicate at some expense, while simultaneously and disingenuously
asserting highly exaggerated claims of equity and social justice. 33
This Article considers two issues. First, it seeks to provide a more
precise description of the jurisprudential methodology employed in
Islamic finance that has led to its failure. The dominant interpretive
approach within contemporary Islamic jurisprudence, and Islamic finance
in particular, shares many common features with the jurisprudential theo-
ries of Christopher Columbus Langdell. Both approaches are excessively
rigid and dependent on formal exercises of logic, 3 4 allowing the jurist or
32. This disparity between Langdellian means and functional ends was not lost on
the original founders, and each made an attempt to compensate for this by accommodat-
ing public interest to some extent in their respective theories of economics. For example,
Sadr indicates that contemporary jurists must engage in robust independent juristic rea-
soning to develop some of the rules of Islamic economics, clearly envisioning discretion
and public interest as an implicit part of that process. See IQTISADUNA, supra note 17, at
364-90; see also infra Part IV.B.3. Qutb, at least in earlier editions of his work, Social
Justice in Islam, references the importance of public interest in developing contemporary
rules. See Hamid Algar, supra note 17, at 14-15. Finally, Maudoodi's notion of a "theo-
democracy" is an attempt to combine Islamic norms with the demands of modern soci-
ety. MAUDOODI, supra note 22. Only Sadr comes close to developing a methodology that
incorporates these principles. See infra Part IV. Perhaps because they died when Islamic
banking was either not in existence (in the case of Qutb) or in its infancy (in the cases of
Sadr and Maudoodi), none of the three grasps the extent to which some of the most
basic prohibitions they embrace, including the interest ban, render Islamic finance not
simply inconvenient but also entirely impracticable in the modern era. As a result, the
relative functional flexibility they espouse could not possibly succeed, unless it develops
further to encompass those basic prohibitions, as this Article seeks to do in Part IV
hereof.
33. Others made related observations on Islamic economics and finance, though not
so much from a legal perspective. See, e.g., EI-Gamal, supra note 15, at 135-36; OLIVIER
Roy, THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM, 132-46 (Carol Volk trans., 1994) (1992); MAXIME
RODINSON, ISLAM AND CAPITALISM (Brian Pearce trans., 1973) (1966); TIMUR KURAN, ISLAM
AND MAMMON: THE ECONOMIC PREDICAMENTS OF ISLAMISM (2004). Kuran describes
Islamic economics as "simplistic, incoherent and largely irrelevant to present economic
challenges." See USC Today, Conversation With Timur Kuran, Dec. 18, 2006, http://
www.usc.edu/uscnews/stories/13215.html.
34. It is important to note that the failings of Islamic finance are not necessarily due
to formalism per se, but to the type of logic-driven formalism characteristic of Langdel-
lianism. For example, Justice Scalia unapologetically embraces a certain type of neo-
formalism based upon a strictly textual interpretation of statutes and the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
23-25 (1997). However, Scalia makes abundantly clear that his approach does not con-
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judge comparatively little interpretive control over the development of legal
rules. 35
Second, it seeks to explain how Islamic principles might be used in a
more salutary fashion in finance, avoiding unnecessarily the elaborate
obfuscations and complications that serve no practical purpose while
achieving some modicum of social justice in an Islamic setting.36 The
more extreme forms of Legal Realism are not a workable solution in light of
the nature of religious jurisprudence and the deep, historic importance of
giving some role to Islamic doctrine and sacred text in developing Islam's
legal rules. Rather than attempt a comprehensive alternative methodology,
this Article seeks to outline principles necessary for any credible attempt at
reform and will provide specific examples of how such principles might be
applied. In so doing, it will become apparent that the changes necessary to
cern itself with the development of judge-made common law, such as that described by
Langdell; rather, he suggests that the role of such judge-made law in the modern era of a
democratically elected legislature should be severely curtailed. See id. at 3-14. Scalia is
critical of legal education, as developed by Langdell, on the grounds that it creates a
legal culture wherein there is an understanding that a judge plays a significant role in
creating the law rather than simply interpreting a law created and implemented by
others. See id. Therefore, Scalia's formalist and textualist approach presupposes a dem-
ocratically elected legislature accountable to the general public that continually enacts
laws as it sees fit. This approach is very different from the logic-driven quasi-scientific
judge or jurist driven inquiry, which plagued Langdellianism in its time and plagues
Islamic finance today.
35. No area of modern Islamic law, as currently applied, is immune to this same
criticism, but the doctrinal failings are more obvious in Islamic finance. In alternative
legal realms where the shari'a dominates the modern Islamic world, the concern of
developing consistent legal tools sensitive to both social justice and modern contextual
realities is less prominent. An excellent example is in the Islamic personal law, which is
patently, unambiguously and without exception biased in favor of males within the
traditional interpretive Islamic approaches. See, e.g., WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW
188 (1998); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Islam and Human Rights: Beyond the Universality
Debate, 94 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 95, 97-100 (2000); NOEL J. COULSON, SUCCESSION IN THE
MUSLIM FAMILY (1971); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 12-46 (2d ed.
2001); Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic
States, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 202, 208 (1990). In many Islamic nations in the world today,
these rules generally apply, though exceptions exist. See, e.g., WEISS, supra note 35, at
188; RENE DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 438
(2d ed. 1978). However, the rigorous and extensive demands of the modern commercial
marketplace that so shape Islamic doctrine in the area of finance play a less direct role in
the development of personal law. See generally EsposITo, supra note 35. Thus, rather
than conform to changed circumstances through artifice, jurists instead continue to
apply personal law as it has always been applied. See id.
36. The author does not suggest that any form of social justice or fairness would
satisfy the Muslim demand for a unique brand of finance. Naturally, those Muslims
attracted to a concept such as Islamic finance take Islamic doctrine very seriously and
would want any financial institution in which they invest to have a uniquely Islamic
character. See id. at 101-2 (indicating that the desire to retain a distinct cultural identity
drives much of Islamic economics); see also infra Part IV.A. Nevertheless, though iden-
tity politics play a role in developing a unique form of finance understood to be
"Islamic," social and economic justice play an equally important, if not more important,
role. Moreover, the author's recommendations in Part IV do not call for the elimination
of culturally distinct Islamic financial institutions, but rather their reexamination in a
way that would permit them to serve the social justice and fairness goals that Muslims
seek and that proponents of Islamic finance advertise.
Vol. 40
2007 Langdellianism and the Failures of Islamic Finance
develop an interpretive system, which will achieve the objectives of Islamic
finance, are not as vast as might be imagined.
This Article illustrates its two central themes through an admittedly
contentious comparison3 7 of the jurisprudential theories of Langdell and
Muhammad Ibn Idris al-Shafi'i, the person credited by the dominant con-
temporary proponents of Islamic finance as responsible for systematizing
the Islamic jurisprudence they use. Their respective jurisprudential inter-
pretive systems, which the author shall call "modalities," are remarkably
similar, both in terms of methodology and the consequences flowing from
the application thereof. The author accepts Sherman Jackson's description
of the American jurisprudential tradition as being "uniquely and abun-
dantly rich in analytical tools and methods for inquiring into the nature,
function, problems and possibilities of law."'38 The use of these tools, and
the application of this comparative approach, provides useful insights for
the American legal scholar on the basic and essential flaws in the domi-
nant Langdellian interpretive trends that inhere to modern Islamic juris-
prudence. As Professor Fletcher notes, these tools suggest solutions to
seemingly intractable legal problems that might not otherwise be
apparent.3 9
Part I of this Article discusses the basic jurisprudential theories of
Christopher Columbus Langdell, and then describes the reasons that
37. Despite the similarities in their respective approaches, the author has found only
one other comparison of Shafi'i to Christopher Columbus Langdell, but this effort
shows substantial limitations and is largely incomplete. See Amr A. Shalakany, The Ana-
lytics of the Social in Private Law Theory: A Comparative Study 142-59 (1990) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with UMI's Dissertation Abstracts
database). For example, Shalakany does not assign nearly the same fundamental impor-
tance to hadith in Shafi'i's jurisprudential system that this Article does, a puzzling omis-
sion given the importance of the hadith to Shafi'i himself. See id.; see also WAEL B.
HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIc LEGAL THEORIES 29 (1997) (remarking that, as compared
to the discussions on hadith, "[njearly everything else [in Shafi'i's seminal work, Al-
Risala,] seems tangential"). Moreover, Shalakany tends to regard Islamic analogical rea-
soning, or qiyas, as somehow deductive in nature, similar to the deductive logic that
Langdell employed to derive his rules from fundamental principles. See Shalakany,
supra note 37, at 149-50. This Article takes almost an opposite approach, arguing that
qiyas expands the specific hadith into Langdellian fundamental principles, and the type
of demonstrable, Cartesian deduction insisted upon by Langdell did not exist in the
Islamic context. Shalakany's comparison is limited in other ways as well. For example,
he properly shows how both Langdell and Shafi'i created formal systems of law based on
logic. However, he fails to contrast the systems in any methodological level of detail,
both in deriving the proper cases and in expanding those cases into fundamental princi-
ples or fundamental rules from which all law would be developed. See id. Finally and
most importantly, Shalakany does not, and given the lack of methodological detail could
not, provide any contrast on the development of particular legal rules under the respec-
tive systems, nor does he, nor could he, compare the resulting failures of Langdellianism
in the two contexts. To be fair to Shalakany, these were not his aims, as his very interest-
ing and thorough dissertation fundamentally concerns the development of legal con-
sciousness in the United States and Egypt, not the failures of the respective interpretive
systems. See id. at 108-09.
38. Sherman A. Jackson, Fiction and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analysis of Usul
al-Fiqh, in STUDIES IN IstAmc LEGAL THEORY 177, 180 (Bernard G. Weiss ed., 2002).
39. See George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J.
CoMp. L. 683, 695-97 (1999).
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Langdellianism ultimately fell from favor. Part II describes the Langdellian
formalist modalities operating in Islamic finance allegedly developed by
Shafi'i, 40 and then compares them to Langdellianism in terms of method-
ological approach. Specific examples relating to commerce are also pro-
vided in Part II to demonstrate how the Islamic Langdellian modalities
function in Islamic finance. Part III outlines the principal rules governing
contemporary Islamic finance through application of the Langdellian
modalities, and then discusses how the existence of these financial rules
results in the establishment of a bizarre and highly artificial construct that
fails to address the social justice concerns central to the creation of Islamic
banking and finance. Part IV discusses the principles that any alternative
approach must follow to be faithful to the Islamic tradition and capable of
achieving the central ontological objective of fairness in a commercially
practicable manner.
I. The Rise and Fall of Langdellian Legal Orthodoxy
A. Langdellian Methodology and Attendant Implications
Christopher Columbus Langdell has been widely credited as the crea-
tor of the classical and orthodox theory of American jurisprudence. 4 1 The
basic thesis of Langdellianism is that law is a science, akin to the natural
sciences, and that the relevant data set for the science of law are cases.
4 2
From proper selection of the specimen cases, 4 3 the legal scientist could
derive the few, general fundamental legal principles that exist through
inductive reasoning.4 4
The legal principles so derived functioned as the constituent ontologi-
cal units within the construct. 4 5 From them, through the rigorous and
almost Cartesian application of logic and deductive reasoning, a series of
clear specific rules would be derived that would govern any given case.
4 6
The specific rules themselves were formalistic in conception, meaning that
they were framed in a manner that made their application uncontroversial
when applied to stipulated facts. 4 7 The rules would then be the bases of
40. Unfortunately, although references to Shi'ism and Shi'i scholars, such as
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, appear in this Article, Shi'i Islamic jurisprudence generally
lies beyond its purview.
41. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977); Thomas C.
Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983); Pierre Schlag, Law and Phre-
nology, 110 H~Av. L. REV. 877, 896 (1997).
42. See GILMORE, supra note 41, at 42.
43. Langdell asserted that the vast majority cases would not be worthy of study and
might even prove "worse than useless." C.C. Langdell, Preface to the First Edition of A
SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at viii-ix (2d ed., Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 1879). However, the fundamental principles that exist in the law could be discov-
ered from studying the properly selected cases. See id. at viii-ix. Interestingly, however,
Langdell never specified the means by which these proper cases could be identified.
44. See Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence:
The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1428 (1997).
45. See Schlag, supra note 41, at 898.
46. See Feldman, supra note 44, at 1428; see also Grey, supra note 41, at 16-21.
47. See id. at 11.
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decision-making in future cases. 4 8
Three important consequences flow from the Langdellian jurispru-
dential modalities that resonate in the Islamic context. First, the modalities
possess an inherent disdain for any notion of judicial discretion. They sup-
pose that capable judges can deduce the applicable formal rule from the
established principles in an uncontroversial manner.49 To the Langdel-
lians, the notion that a judge would have any discretion in the deductive
application of the rule would be abhorrent, as it would render the law an
unscientific discipline. 50
Second, the Langdellian modalities do not consider public welfare or
public interest when rule-making for precisely the same reason. Langdell
famously remarked that though the "mailbox rule," whereby an acceptance
to a contract offer is deemed given on the date it is placed in the mailbox,
might be more in the public interest, this fact was "irrelevant" because
Langdellian logic made it impossible for a contract to exist before accept-
ance was communicated to the offeror. 5 1 This position drew the criticism
of Holmes, who famously retorted that the life of the law was not logic, but
experience. 5 2
Finally, Langdellianism is largely impervious to broader social and
economic developments. Fixed, immutable, and abstract principles simply
cannot form the ontological units of a jurisprudential modality that would
admit extensive social change. 53 Langdellianism was designed to "dis-
cover" rules that admitted no possibility of evolution or development, and
consequently could not keep pace with rapidly changing social, political
and economic circumstances. 54
B. The Failures of Langdellianism in the Modern Era
There are four principal reasons that the Langdellian modality ulti-
mately "crumbled," to use Gilmore's phrase, replaced by jurisprudential
theories that relied less on pure logic, and more on discretion and experi-
ence, to develop and hone legal rules.5 5 First, the few fundamental princi-
ples and doctrines upon which the Langdellians placed so much reliance
failed to materialize, as they were under constant revision and supple-
48. See id. at 20-21. There was a circularity to the reasoning, as cases provided the
bases upon which the principles were induced and rules derived, but the rules also
provided the bases upon which cases were to be decided. For an analysis of this circular-
ity and the potential means by which it might be addressed, see id. at 20-24.
49. See id. at 11-12 (describing the system as "doubly formal" as a result).
50. See GILMORE, supra note 41, at 42-43.
51. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 20-21 (2d ed. 1880).
52. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880)
(reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1879)).
53. See GILMORE, supra note 41, at 42-43. One commentator posits a potential means
of development whereby new principles are "discovered" from existing case law and
rules derived, but even he admits that such a process is inherently slow and strains at
the foundational elements of the Langdellian jurisprudential modality. Grey, supra note
41, at 31-33.
54. GILMORE, supra note 41, at 43.
55. Id. at 68.
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ment.5 6 Secondly, judges faced with difficult cases often found two con-
flicting principles equally applicable. Cardozo went so far as to suggest
that discretion was inherent in the judicial enterprise.5 7 This position was
radical for its time.5 8
Moreover, considerations of public policy or justice were never sup-
pressed, as judges or juries would simply neglect to apply them, finding
one way or another to reach the result that seemed more just or practical.5 9
Finally, Langdellianism failed to keep pace with rapid social change in the
beginning of the century due to its insistence on timeless principles. It
became, to paraphrase Langdell himself, largely "irrelevant" as a swiftly
changing polity required a new legal architecture and jurisprudential
modality to develop rules more consonant with the reality in which mod-
ern actors tended to find themselves. 60 The notion that sixteenth century
legal decisions would continue to govern life in the post-industrial world
could simply not be sustained.
II. Langdellian Modalities in the Islamic Experience
A. Historical Qualification
Islamic jurists, like American judges purporting to apply common law
many centuries old, are not historians. They often work at cross-purposes
to history, relying on highly stylized accounts that are, at best, simplistic
and reductive and, at worst, inaccurate, to legitimize the jurisprudence on
which they rely. However, these narratives are ingrained in the legal cul-
ture and serve as the engine of jurisprudential development.
There can be no doubt that contemporary traditionalist Islamic schol-
ars, including those that operate in the realm of Islamic finance, adhere to
what they consider the solely authentic brand of shari'a with its origins in
the dawn of Islam. 6 1 These scholars also overwhelmingly credit Shafi'i
56. For a contemporaneous critique of precisely this phenomenon, see Thurman W.
Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich, 84 U. PA. L. REV.
811, 820-821 (1936).
57. See BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166-67 (1946).
58. See GILMORE, supra note 41, at 77.
59. See Grey, supra note 41, at 45.
60. See id. at 39.
61. See MOHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, AN APPROACH TO THE QUR'ANIC SCIENCES 433-34
(Mohammad Swaleh Siddiqui trans., Rafiq Abdur Rehman ed., 2000) (describing rules
derived under the Langdellian modalities, including those of interest, as having been
established and agreed upon for over 1400 years, thereby dating it as being developed in
Muhammad's time). Usmani has served on the Pakistani Bench and on the boards of a
number of Islamic banks. See MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRA, USUL AL-FIQH 8-12 (1969); see also
BADRAN ABu AL-AYNAYN BADRAN, USUL AL-FIQH 5-12 (1965) (indicating that the modali-
ties' origins principally lie in the period immediately following Muhammad's death).
Badran and Abu Zahra have produced highly influential works on Islamic jurispruden-
tial methodologies. See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRU-
DENCE, at xvi (2003) (using Abu Zahra and Badran as principal references on the
modalities used to derive the shari'a). In addition, the author has heard frequent refer-
ences in several Iraqi law schools to Abu Zahra and Badran as two of the most authorita-
tive voices on Sunni Islamic modalities in the modern world.
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with development of the methodology they use to derive the shari'a.6 2
Therefore, most would not simply credit Shafi'i as the founder of Islamic
jurisprudence but would go further and indicate that Shafi'i did not found
the jurisprudence so much as set down in writing (dawwana) a modality
that existed from Islam's earliest days. This distinction consecrated the
modality as an elemental part of the Islamic faith rather than the ex post
interpretations of jurists, such as Shafi'i, who lived two or more centuries
after Muhammad's death.6 3
More reform-minded Muslims would not agree with this idea of a
sacred jurisprudence, as significant evolution of Islamic doctrine requires
reexamination of the Islamic legend concerning shari'a development. 6 4
Moreover, his historical account is simplistic and almost certainly inaccu-
rate in many respects. Shafi'i's role in developing the jurisprudence is one
area of contention. 65 Another would be the extent to which formalist rigid-
62. See, e.g., ABU ZAHRA, supra note 61, at 12-14 (1969); BADRAN, supra note 61, at
11-12; M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari'ah: Sources, Interpretation, and
Rule-Making, I UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 136-37 (describing, in admirable
detail, the modern understanding of Islamic jurisprudence and methodologies used to
derive it; crediting Shafi'i with systematizing this dominant methodology; and indicating
that Shafi'i is commonly considered the founder of Islamic jurisprudence).
63. See BADRAN, supra note 61, at 11-12; ("And Shafi'i was faced with great juristic
riches from the Companions and Successors to the Apostle of God [Muhammad] and
thus we cannot say before these great riches anything other than that Shafi'i set down in
writing the bases that the riches focus upon.") (translated by author); see also ABU
ZAHRA, supra note 61, at 12 (using the same verb, dawanna, to describe Shafi'i's achieve-
ment); Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 62, at 136. Cf. KAMALI, supra note 61, at 4-6 (argu-
ing that most Islamic methodological principles employed today largely predate Shafi'i,
but nonetheless crediting him with founding the modality).
64. Abdullahi An-Na'im has made the point repeatedly in his writings that the
shari'a is not an inherently divine code of conduct, but rather a fundamentally norma-
tive rather than legal code with roots in the divine, ultimately interpreted and applied by
humans throughout history and consequently subject to manipulation and error. See,
e.g., An-Na'im, supra note 35, at 97 ("While Muslims tend to ascribe divine authority to
historical formulations of shari'a by jurists of the eighth and ninth centuries, it is clear
that the precise content of that normative system has always been, and will continue to
be, the product of human understanding in specific historical context"); ABDULLAHI
AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-33 (1990). An-Na'im indicates that unless Muslims dissociate
the divine origin of the shari'a from the continuing human efforts to interpret it, Islam
cannot play a positive role in the lives of Muslims. See An-Na'im, supra note 35, at 97.
This is emphatically true in the case of Islamic finance.
65. Much scholarship, including the work of the most respected and influential Ori-
entalists of the last century, emphasizes the ultimate influence of Shafi'i and dubs him
the father of Islamic jurisprudence. JOSEPH SCHACHT, ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRU-
DENCE 11 (1950); NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 59 (1964); IGNAZ
GOLDZIHER, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW 21 (Hamori trans., 1981).
Some recent scholars, however, and most prominently Wael Hallaq, indicate that this is
largely historical fiction, and that Shafi'i had at best a minor role in the development of
Islamic jurisprudence. See generally Wael Hallaq, Was Al-Shafi'i the Master Architect of
Islamic Jurisprudence?, 25 INT'L J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 587 (1993). Others interpret
Shafi'i's work differently, with Jackson considering him to be an anti-formalist (and an
Arabist bigot) and another commentator insisting that he never intended to create a legal
system with four identifiable sources of law. Jackson, supra note 38, at 187-91;Joseph E.
Lowry, Does Shafi'i Have a Theory of Four Sources of Law?, in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LEGAL
THEORY 23-50 (Bernard G. Weiss ed., 2002).
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ity is truly faithful to classical Islamic interpretive theory. M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, a renowned expert on international criminal law, has indicated that
classical Islamic criminal law was by its nature "policy oriented", even if in
the contemporary era it is often applied in a "rigid and repressive" fash-
ion.66 Mohammad Fadel and Sherman Jackson have been in the forefront
of work concerning the development of classical Islamic law that suggests
that it was far more flexible and discretionary than once believed.
67
Nevertheless, to the extent that particular modern Islamic interpretive
modalities rely on ahistorical legends to sustain them, they are little differ-
ent from the historical myths common in the United States. Among such
American myths are the dubious historical propositions that seminal
Supreme Court cases fundamental to American legal culture, such as Mar-
bury v. Madison and Lochner v. New York, respectively stand for the estab-
lishment of judicial review and as a cautionary tale about the dangers of
judicial overreaching on the basis of a fashionable social or economic the-
ory.68 The work undertaken to uncover these legends in the Islamic and
American contexts is, without question, worthy and commendable for any
variety of reasons, but for purposes of this Article, irrelevant.
The author instead elects to engage the stylized historical narrative of
Islamic jurisprudential history on its own terms, as it ultimately controls
the hermeneutic and points the way towards enactment of necessary,
organic and workable adjustments to the shari'a. Therefore, the author
emphasizes that the narrative related herein is a reconstruction of Shafi'i,
presupposing the role that Islamic finance proponents give him as setting
down in writing their modality, and describing his views within the con-
straints of those assumptions. The description is not, by any means,
intended to be a historically faithful rendition of this controversial figure,
66. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law and the Protection of Human Rights in
the Islamic Criminal Justice System, in ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (1982).
67. See, e.g., Mohammad Fadel, Istihsan is Nine-Tenths of the Law: The Puzzling Rela-
tionship of Usul to Furu' in the Maliki Madhhab, in STUDIES IN IsLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY
161-76 (Bernard G. Weiss ed., 2002); Jackson, supra note 38, at 180; MOHAMMAD FADEL,
ADJUDICATION IN THE MALIKI MADHAB; A STUDY OF LEGAL PROCESS IN MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC LAW
(1995); Sherman Jackson, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRU-
DENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI (1996).
68. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see also Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905); Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat
Look Like Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 13-32 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004);
David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the Growth of the
Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325-58 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
Marbury is the more instructive example, given its centrality to American jurisprudence.
Historical research seems to demonstrate that John Marshall is not the father of judicial
review, and that Marbury did not intend to establish judicial review, a doctrine which
was in its day uncontroversial and utterly unremarkable. See McConnell, supra note 68.
Therefore, the narrative, told to every incoming law student and universally accepted as
fact by the bar and bench alike, of a clever Chief Justice ruling in the face of a hostile
President to expand judicial power considerably, appears to be without historical basis.
See id. It perhaps was concocted at a later date by a legal culture eager to anchor this
vitally important doctrine in early Supreme Court precedent through a compelling, if
historically false, narrative. See id. Storytelling, it seems, is not unique to the Islamic
context.
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or of the rich and multifaceted jurisprudence that developed in the classi-
cal era after him.
69
B. Shafi'i and the Formalist Modalities in the Methodology of Hadith
Reporting
ShafiTs central thesis, developed in his seminal work, AI-Risala, and
elsewhere, is that revelation is comprehensive, determinative, and com-
plete. 70 Revelation includes not only the Qur'an but also the hadith, or the
specific utterances of Muhammad. 7 1 This inclusion of the hadith in revela-
tion adds considerable legal material to the corpus of the shari'a, given that
the Qur'an has only approximately 200 verses with legal content unrelated
to religious ritual, 72 and few of these verses are well developed or well
defined. For example, the Qur'an proscribes transactions involving the
consumption of riba (illicit gain), while simultaneously permitting, and
indeed encouraging, bai' (sale), without providing precise definitions to
determine which of the principles applies in any particular situation.7 3
The Qur'an orders believers to honor their contracts74 but provides no sup-
plementary doctrinal principles of contract by which a jurist might deter-
mine when a breach has taken place, what the appropriate remedies are
and whether there is an exception to the general Qur'anic principle. The
hadith, by contrast, are more numerous, specific, and contextual-in many
ways, akin to cases in the Langdellian construct. 75
Shafi'i not only includes the hadith but also makes clear that they
never depart from the maxims of the Qur'an and only serve to clarify and
expound upon it.7 6 Shafi'i doggedly holds to this position even when it
69. There are numerous, valuable historical works on the development of Islamic
jurisprudence in the classical era. For a classical discussion, see, e.g., SCHACHT, supra
note 65; COULSON, supra note 65; GOLDZIHER, supra note 65. For a more recent discus-
sion, see, e.g. WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES (1997) [hereinafter
HISTORY]; WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW (2005) [herein-
after ORIGINS]; WEISS, supra note 35. The author makes reference to these from time to
time, though the focus remains primarily on the contemporary orthodox historical leg-
end typically endorsed by proponents of Islamic finance.
70. MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS AL-SHAFI'I, AL-RISALA c91c 43-47 (Ahmad Muhammad Shakir
ed., 1940) [hereinafter RISALA].
71. See id. 9 43-47, 225-27, 569-71.
72. See Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, Introduction to MUHAMMAD BAQIR AS-SADR, LESSONS IN
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 1-2 (Roy Parviz Mottahedeh trans., 2003).
73. See QUR'AN 2:275.
74. See id. 5:1.
75. For example, doctrinal principles have been derived from Muhammad telling a
man to tie his camel so that it does not flee, or instructing merchants that forward sales
should always be accompanied by necessary specifics. See infra notes 212, 141. Analo-
gizing to an American judicial case can only be taken so far, as Muhammad, acting as
God's Apostle, clearly had the authority to issue an advisory opinion, or to settle politi-
cal questions.
76. See, e.g., RISALA, supra note 70, 9I 535-37 (using Muhammad's practices as
related by the hadith to supply the particulars for the pilgrimage to Mecca mandated by
the Qur'an), 613-18 (using the pilgrimage, the rules of prayer and theft as examples of
the hadith providing particulars, and in some cases exceptions, that are absent from the
Qur'anic mandates).
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appears untenable. 7 7 For example, the Prophetic hadith prescribe death by
stoning as the punishment for zina (non-marital relations) for non-virgin
women,78 a punishment that remains law in some Islamic countries to this
day. 79 However, this punishment lies in flat contradiction to the Qur'an,
which prescribes one hundred lashes for any man or woman engaged in
sexual relations outside of marriage.8 0 Shafi'i refuses to see this as a con-
tradiction, and instead points to a different verse that describes the pun-
ishment for slave women for falling into shame ("atayna bil fahisha"), to be
half that of free women, reasoning that the hadith established no contradic-
tion, but merely created a third category, non-virgin women.8 1
Therefore, to Shafi'i, the hadith are absolutely central in Islamic juris-
prudence to the creation of a legal architecture. 8 2 They are the fundamen-
tal ontological units of the jurisprudential theory, which are in practice, if
not in theory, superior even to the Qur'an's verses.
For revelation to be comprehensive, determinative, and complete, the
hadith, though similar to case law at first blush, must serve a role in
Shafi'i's analysis not unlike that of Langdell's fundamental principles.
Shafi'i needed to take two crucially important steps to achieve this. First,
Shafi'i required definitional parameters to determine which hadith were the
proper ones to use. 83 As Langdell faced casebooks from dozens of jurisdic-
tions, some centuries old, Shafi'i faced an unmanageable number of hadith
supposedly from Muhammad, his Companions, and revered Successors. 84
Some form of discrimination and determination undoubtedly was neces-
sary to develop a sustainable jurisprudential architecture. Langdell never
precisely defined his parameters, other than to declare the vast majority of
cases to be "worse than useless," but Shafi'i was much more careful in this
respect. 85 His approach, repeated throughout his works, is clear:
Every hadith related by a person of confidence, on the authority of a person
of confidence, until [the chain] ends with the Prophet, is certain to be from
the Prophet and we do not disregard the hadith of the Prophet under any
circumstances unless another hadith from the Prophet contradicts it; if there
is a contradiction and one abrogates the other, then we accept the abrogating
over the abrogated. If there is no sign of abrogation, then we accept the more
certain of the two narrations, and if they are both certain, then we look to
77. See generally id. 11 610-40.
78. See id. 227.
79. See, e.g., Vanessa von Struensee, Stoning, Shari'a, and Human Rights Law in Nige-
ria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 405, 405-406 (2005).
80. See QUR'AN 24:2.
81. RISALA, supra note 70, ' 227 (translated by author).
82. This point seems to be a matter upon which even Islamic historians would agree
in light of the emphasis given to it in the Risala. See, e.g., SCHACHT, supra note 65, at 12;
HISTORY, supra note 69, at 25. To this day, proponents of Islamic finance, and Islamic
scholars generally, invariably describe the Qur'an and the hadith as the two primary
sources of legal rules under the shari'a. See, e.g., MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, PART-
NERSHIP AND PROFIT-SHARING IN ISLAMIC LAW 12 (1985); Au ZAHRA, supra note 61, at 100.
83. See SCHACHT, supra note 65, at 315-19.
84. See ORIGINS, supra note 69, at 70-71.
85. See SCHACHT, supra note 65, at 315-19.
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which harmonizes best with the Qur'an and the remainder of the hadith.86
The most important element of Shafi'i's position on hadith can be gleaned
from this quotation-they are to be derived almost exclusively through
chains of reliable transmitters, known as an isnad.8 7 If the isnad appears
sound, then the authenticity of the hadith can only be questioned in the
event of a direct contradiction with another sound hadith.8 8 Even if a con-
tradiction exists, harmonization with the Qur'an may establish the author-
ity and applicability of the hadith only when no other more determinist
technique offers an adequate solution.8 9
Thus, selection of the hadith, the cases from which the fundamental
principles would be drawn, was originally neither based on compatibility
with the Qur'an nor on the dictates of human discretion, opinion, or har-
mony with public policy or practice, but rather on a lengthy chain of sup-
posedly reliable narrators over a span exceeding one hundred years. 90
That this methodology is highly flawed is accepted quite widely beyond the
world of Islamic theologians. 9 1 However, Shafi'i returns to this point
repeatedly, insisting on the isnad as the premier means by which the
authenticity of hadith could be ascertained and selected. 92
C. Shafi'i's Reductionist Interpretive Controls in the Emerging Formalist
Modality
ShafiTs second step to transform the hadith from specific cases to fun-
damental principles derived from the need to adopt a jurisprudential tool
that would enable extension of the hadith beyond their literal original
terms. One possible solution would have been the adoption by qadis, or
judges, of a largely juristic discretionary principle whenever gaps arose,
86. MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS SHAFI'I, Ikhtilaf Malik wa Shafi'i, in 8 MAWSU'AT AL-IMAM AL-
SHAFI'I AL-KITAB AL-UMM 513 (Abdul Muttalib ed., 2001) [hereinafter Ikhtilaf Malik]
(translated by author).
87. Eventually this method resulted in 4,000-5,000 hadith being accepted as sound
out of a possible half million reports. See ORIGINS, supra note 69, at 107. As with Lang-
dell, the vast majority of "cases" turned out to be "worse than useless." Id. at 110.
88. See SCHACHT, supra note 65, at 12.
89. See id.
90. An example of an isnad appearing in Shafi'i's works reads: "And Malik, [who has
heard] from Zaid son of Aslam [who has heard] from Atta son of Yasar, [who has heard]
from Bassir son of Sa'id, who reports that Abu Huraira heard the Apostle of God state
.... Ikhtilaf Malik, supra note 86, at pt. 2 (translated by author).
91. See, e.g., SCHAGHT, supra note 65, at 4 ("It is generally conceded that ... the
classical corpus contains a great many traditions that cannot possibly be authentic. All
efforts to extract from this often self-contradictory mass an authentic core . . . have
failed."). See generally IGNAZ GOLDZIHER, 2 MUSLIM STUDIES [MUHAMMEDANISCHE STUDIEN]
17-251 (C.R. Barber & S.M. Stern trans., 1971); G. H. A. JUYNBOLL, MUSLIM TRADITION:
STUDIES IN CHRONOLOGY, PROVENANCE AND AUTHORSHIP OF EARLY HADITH (1983). Even
those who find the extreme skepticism of the earliest commentators toward the sub-
stance of the hadith unwarranted consider the science of hadith-gathering to have been
highly suspect and prone to error, if not outright fabrication. See, e.g., COULSON, supra
note 65, at 64-65, 70; HISTORY, supra note 69, at 3; ORIGINS, supra note 69, at 104.
92. See SCHACHT, supra note 65, at 12 (indicating that Shafi'i repeats this point with
"tedious monotony").
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causing a slow movement towards recognizable norms based on the
Qur'an, hadith and the opinions of judges. Yet Shafi'i abhorred any such
approach, and spoke particularly stridently against adoption of the doc-
trine of istihsan, or preference based on generally equitable principles. 9 3
Shafi'i argues that istihsan is not based on revelation and consequently
is invalid.94 Moreover, Shafi'i insists istihsan is entirely arbitrary, possibly
resulting in different conclusions under the shari'a for the same problem in
different locations at different times.9 5 To Shafi'i, this inconsistency in
result must be, from a jurisprudential standpoint, entirely impossible. 96
Shafi'i is a classic Langdellian in this instance, clinging tenaciously, and
beyond the bounds of good sense, to the notion that law must be a science,
and that there should be exactly one determinable outcome to any given
juristic problem. Shafi'i's objections are deep-rooted and transcend policy
considerations. He compares the application of istihsan to voicing delu-
sions and engaging in sin and, at one point, goes so far as to describe
istihsan as illicit pleasure (taladhudh).97 This is similar to the Langdellians'
reaction to Cardozo's ideas on judicial discretion as a form of "hard-core
pornography." 98
Shafi'i instead repeats his demand that all law be grounded in revela-
tion, if not explicitly, then through dala'il, or signs, contained in revelation
itself.9 9 He considers these signs akin to the stars and the moon, which
themselves are signs that permit Muslims to determine the direction of
Mecca and adhere to the Qur'anic command to pray towards Mecca when
they are not in its vicinity. 10 0 This forced metaphor serves only to rein-
force Shafi'i's belief that law was driven by some form of quasi-scientific
logic, and that observation and study of the signs would determine the
proper answer to any legal question.
Shafi'i indicated that qiyas, or a form of reasoning that is largely, but
not exclusively, analogical, was the sole means by which the signs might be
discovered and the cases translated into broader fundamental princi-
ples. 10 1 Qiyas is less rigorous than the strictly Cartesian logic instituted by
Langdell, and, from a logician's point of view, it is no doubt extremely
93. Shafi'i devotes an entire treatise to this subject. See MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS SHAFI'I,
Kitab Ibtal al-Istihsan, in 9 MAWSU'AT AL-IMAM AL-SHAFI'I AL-KITAB AL-UMM 57 (Abdul Mut-
talib ed., 2001) [hereinafter Kitab Ibtal). Literally, the term istihsan comes from the root
hasana, meaning "to be good" or "to deem good." HANs WEHR, ARABIC-ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY 208 (J. M. Cowan ed., 4th ed. 1994). A prominent Hanafi jurist later described
istihsan as "the request for mildness or facility [sahula] in rulings ... and the leaving of
what is difficult or unpleasant ['asr] for what is simple or pleasant [yusr], which is the
basis of [our] religion." MUHAMMAD IBN AHMAD SARAKHSI, 10 KITAB AL-MABSUT 145
(1993) (translated by author).
94. See Kitab Ibtal, supra note 93, at 65-67, 76; see also RISALA, supra note 70, 1 504-
05.
95. See Kitab Ibtal, supra note 93, at 75-76.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 76; see also RisALA, supra note 70, 1 1464.
98. GILMORE, supra note 41, at 77.
99. See RIsALA, supra note 70, 9 1456; see also Kitab lbtal, supra note 93, at 71-73.
100. See Kitab Ibtal, supra note 93, at 71-73.
101. See RIsALA, supra note 70, ' 1460.
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problematic. 10 2 In that sense, it seems an unusual choice by Shafi'i, who
clearly preferred logic and certainty to discretion and potential variation.
Yet he had little other choice because qiyas is as reductive a tool as can be
imagined, while still fulfilling the ultimate purpose that Shafi'i desired-the
transformation of the hadith from specific cases to fundamental principles,
the central units upon which Islamic jurisprudence rests. Unlike Langdell,
this methodology is not two steps-inductive reasoning of cases to a princi-
ple, then deduction from a principle to a formal rule-but rather one step
whereby a specifically precise rule is extended by analogy to a broader rule
that can be thought of as a fundamental principle, or at least a fundamen-
tal rule, given its breadth. 10 3 Despite this small difference between Lang-
dell and Shafi'i, there are remarkable similarities between their approaches.
Shafi'i and those following him make clear that qiyas includes, but is
not limited to, pure analogical reasoning that is almost inductive in nature,
whereby a jurist identifies a ratio legis, or 'illa, and then applies this 'illa in
a comparable case. 10 4 The classic example is the prohibition against all
intoxicants based upon the Qur'anic prohibition against the consumption
of alcohol.10 5 Shafi'i and his successors also subsumed certain forms of a
fortiori reasoning, better described as deductive, within the qiyas rubric. 10 6
For example, consuming large quantities of an item was prohibited if con-
suming small quantities was forbidden. 10 7 Shafi'i made clear his prefer-
ence for the latter type of qiyas, given its firmer logical foundations. 10 8
In light of the imprecision that can adhere to the purer forms of ana-
logical reasoning, differing jurists could still reach different results in the
application of qiyas. To further reduce the possibility of non-uniform appli-
cation of the shari'a, Shafi'i introduced (or merely "set down in writing," as
some traditionalists would have it)' 0 9 a second interpretive control known
as ijma, or consensus. 110
The basis for ijma under the current modalities is a hadith that the
community of Muhammad "would never agree to go astray.""' Shafi'i,
apparently unaware of this hadith, referred to two other hadith in which
Muhammad suggests that a Muslim should hold fast to the believers. 1 12
From this, Shafi'i reasoned in a rather strained fashion that if a Muslim is
102. See Wael B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic Law and the Common Law: Logic
and Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 79, 85-86 (1985).
103. For purposes of clarity and consistency the author continues to use the term
"fundamental principle," despite the fact that "fundamental rule" might be more apt in
some contexts.
104. See RisA, supra note 70, ' 594 (using the term ma'na rather than 'illa).
105. See, e.g., Hallaq, supra note 102, at 88-89; see also RisALA, supra note 70, 9t 1394-
1400 (using a separate example concerning hunting during the time of the pilgrimage).
106. See RisALA, supra note 70, 1483.
107. See id.
108. See id. (describing this as the strongest type of qiyas).
109. See ABU ZAHRA, supra note 61, at 189-90 (describing ijma as having been devel-
oped by Muhammad's closest and most revered companions) (translated by author).
110. See RiSALA, supra note 70, IN 1101, 1315.
111. ABU ZA-RA, supra note 61, at 190.
112. See RisALA, supra note 70, c 1101, 1315.
Cornell International Law Journal
not to deviate from the community, then a fortiori the community must be
free of error. 113 Moreover, Shafi'i argued that the communal determina-
tion must be applied in perpetuity because otherwise, the effect of the ijma
would always be to give the current generation of scholars the right to over-
rule their forebears, vanquishing the notion of absolute authority. 114 In
addition to resisting temporal constraints, Shafi'i devoted considerable
energy to refuting the notion that there could be a local or limited Islamic
ijma among a geographical region, or that ijma could apply to a
supermajority of scholars, as opposed to strict unanimity of them." l5
As would be the case with anyone analogizing scientific endeavor to
deduction of legal rules, Shafi'i appeared obsessed with obtaining the sin-
gle correct result and ensuring its uniform application over time and place.
Therefore, Shafi'i's modality is like Langdell's and extraordinarily resistant
to variation. For Langdell, the rules derived from such principles are
deductive, straightforward, and not subject to serious future challenge,
while Shafi'i not only raised hadith to the equivalent of commandments
from God but also crystallized and canonized particular extensions of
them through the doctrines of qiyas and ijma.
D. Anti-formalism and the Langdellian Modality
A full discussion of the dominant Langdellian modalities is impossible
without discussing two anti-formalist tools dismissed by Shafi'i but none-
theless found in Islamic jurisprudence. 1 6 Their influence over the devel-
opment of jurisprudential principles is generally slight in the
contemporary era but is significant enough to bear mention, particularly
because they played a minor role in deriving the rules governing Islamic
finance.
1. Istihsan
Istihsan, the target of Shafi'i's fiercest attacks, is the primary anti-for-
malist jurisprudential tool that still remains part of the dominant modality
applied in modern Islamic finance. 117 It was classically permitted only by
113. See id. '19l 1105, 1320 ("[Alnd thus it is not possible for the community in its
entirety to be in error, on the meaning of the Qur'an, or the hadith or the application of
qiyas") (translated by author).
114. See Ikhtilaf Malik, supra note 86, at 763.
115. See id. at 763-71.
116. This is not meant to suggest that other, lesser sources of Islamic law do not exist.
Bassiouni and Badr do an admirable job of cataloging and describing all such sources.
See Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 62, at 138-159; see also Bassiouni, supra note 66 at 9-
10. It suffices to say, however, that none of the sources other than those described in the
text plays a major role in the development of Islamic jurisprudence in the world of con-
temporary Islamic finance.
117. Interestingly, the dominant modalities, to preserve the impression of a unifiedjurisprudence that has existed from Islam's birth, strive mightily to minimize the differ-
ences between early jurists, such as Shafi'i, who seems to regard istihsan as a moral
failing, and the eponyms of the Hanafi and Maliki schools, the latter of whom indicated
that istihsan is nine tenths of the law. For example, Kamali points out that even Shafi'i
employed istihsan once, though it is hard to see how one casual and minor reference
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two of the four primary schools of thought in Sunni Islam, the Hanafi and
Maliki." 18 Istihsan is of secondary status, to be used only when the hadith
offers no explicit solution, qiyas does not lend a satisfactory answer, and
there is some necessity or reason for applying the alternative rule. t9 For
example, Islamic jurisprudence has derived a prohibition against certain
extraneous stipulations in contracts, based on a series of hadith.' 20 How-
ever, some stipulations common in customary commercial practice are per-
mitted by some jurists through the doctrine of istihsan.121 Therefore, the
continued existence of istihsan may impose fewer interpretive controls in
developing modern commercial rules but the effect is largely marginal.
2. Istislah
Istislah, or concern for the public interest, is a supplementary jurispru-
dential doctrine adopted by the Maliki and Hanbali schools of thought, and
it bears remarkable resemblance to istihsan both in its purposes and its
very narrow scope. 122 It is used to guide the process of qiyas or to provide
an answer that somehow harmonizes with or is near to, but not rigidly
derived from, qiyas.123
E. Demonstrations of Langdellianism: The Problems of Riba and
Gharar in the Formalist Modalities
'Abd al-Razzaq Sanhuri, the premier Arab jurist of the last century,
was as influential to the establishment and subsequent development of the
legal order in the post-colonial Middle East as Blackstone and Coke were to
the development of the common law.124 Sanhuri contended that three doc-
could possibly negate Shafi'i's strident attacks on the doctrine contained in his more
well-known works. See KAMALI, supra note 61, at 344. Abu Zahra posits that Shafi'i was
not directing his attacks against istihsan, as the Hanafis understood it, so much as istis-
lah, discussed infra Part II.D.2, which is what the Malikis really meant by istihsan. See
ABU ZAHRA, supra note 61, at 258-60. In any event, Abu Zahra argues that the differences
are not as great as they might seem. See id. at 271-72.
118. See, e.g., id. at 251; KAMALI, supra note 61, at 332-34. The four classical schools
.of thought within the Sunni jurisprudential tradition are the Hanafis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis
and Malikis. See Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 62, at 161. Modern Islamic scholars tend
not to divide themselves according to school of thought, and, in applying the Langdellian
modalities, tend to minimize any differences that might have existed between the classi-
cal schools. See, e.g., supra note 117.
119. See ABU ZA-RA, supra note 61, at 251.
120. See 'ABD AL-RAZZAQ AHMAD SANHURI, 3 MASADIR AL-HAQQ Fl AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI:
DIRASA MUQARANAH BI-AL-FIQH AL-GHARBI [THE SOURCES OF TRUTH IN ISLAMIC JURISPRU-
DENCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH WESTERN JURISPRUDENCE] 172-73 (1967).
121. See id. at 173.
122. See ABu ZAHRA, supra note 61, at 260 (indicating that Malik's references to istih-
san were primarily meant to cover istislah).
123. See id. at 281-83.
124. As any common lawyer in the early nineteenth century would naturally have a
copy of Blackstone's Commentaries by his side, so any Arab lawyer working in most of
the Arab countries of the Middle East would refer any legal question concerning inter-
pretation of the civil code to Sanhuri's multi-volume Al-Wasit, which functions effec-
tively as his commentaries on the Egyptian Civil Code. See 'ABD AL-RAZ7AQ AHMAD
SANHURI, AL-WASIT F1 SHARH AL-QANUN AL-MADANI AL-JADID (1952). See, e.g., WILLIAM M.
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trinal prohibitions in the shari'a, as interpreted under the dominant modal-
ities, were particularly problematic in the development of Islamic
commercial jurisprudence. These are (a) the prohibition of riba, or illegiti-
mate gain,125 (b) the prohibition of gharar, or particular forms of risk, and
(c) the prohibition of stipulations or multiple bargains in a single contract.
Sanhuri argues that these are entirely divorced from that which commer-
cial practice demands, 126 leading one prominent English legal practitioner
in the Arab world to remark, in furtherance of Sanhuri's claim, that "[i]n
the modern commercial context, the shari'a is an embarrassment."' 2 7
This section examines two of the three problematic principles laid out
by Sanhuri, riba and gharar, as they constitute paradigmatic examples of
the means by which formal fundamental principles are established under
the dominant Langdellian modalities in modern Islamic finance. 1 28
BALLANTYNE, ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES ON AR" LAWS 79 (2000). Sanhuri drafted the civil
codes of both Egypt and Iraq, and served as dean of the historically prestigious Cairo
and Baghdad colleges of law. His civil code is the template of the civil codes of nearly
every nation in the Middle East, excluding those governed entirely by the shari'a. See
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Globalization and Jurisprudence: An Islamic Law Perspective,
54 EMORY L.J. 25, 47 (2005).
125. For a fuller description of the controversies concerning the definition of the term
riba, see infra Section II.E.1.
126. See SANHURI, supra note 120, at 14.
127. BALLANTYNE, supra note 124, at 82.
128. The Article does not discuss the third prohibition, stipulations and multiple bar-
gains in contract, simply because the rather extensive discussion it requires would prove
unnecessarily burdensome to the central theses the Article seeks to advance. The thesis
is demonstrated well enough by the doctrinal prohibitions of riba and gharar. However,
the example of stipulations is a fascinating one, as it demonstrates the extent to which
modern Islamic financiers are forced to ignore the Langdellian modalities when their
extensive and elaborate artifices cannot surmount them. According to Vogel and Hayes,
modern Islamic finance rarely pays heed to the specific prohibitions against stipulations
in contract (such as, for example, a requirement attending the purchase of a camel that
the camel be transported to a particular location at the seller's expense), relying on a
classical interpretation of Ibn Taymiyah that does not appear to prohibit stipulations,
unless they contradict the contract or otherwise violate the shari'a. See VOGEL & HAYES,
supra note 6, at 101 (citing Sanhuri, who quotes Ibn Taymiyah); see also SANHURI, supra
note 120, at 167-68. Ibn Taymiyah belongs to the Hanbali school, which traditionally
approves of a single stipulation in any agreement of sale, but no more. Ibn Qudamah,
for example, indicates that Ibn Hanbal, the eponym of the Hanbali school, reports a
hadith, also contained in two of the six works that constitute the classical corpus of
hadith, which prohibits two stipulations in a sale, but that Ibn Hanbal rejects a separate
hadith, nevertheless appearing in two of the six canonized texts as well, prohibiting even
a single stipulation. See MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN 'ABD ALLAH IBN AHMAD IBN QUDAMAH ET AL., 6
Al-MUGHNI 321-22 (1986). Ibn Taymiyya also rejects the latter hadith on the authority of
his mentor, Ibn Hanbal. However, Ibn Taymiyya says absolutely nothing about the for-
mer restriction. IBN TAYMIYAH, 6 A-FATAWA AL-KUBRA 408 (1987); IBN TAYMIYYA,
NAZARIYYAT AL-'AQD [OPINIONS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT] 14-16 (1977). The irony is that
despite their rigid insistence on the absolute authority of the eternal validity of the Pro-
phetic hadith, the Langdellian proponents of Islamic finance are disregarding one, and
possibly two, hadith with sound isnads per the writings of a single fourteenth century
jurist, who provided no basis at all for doing so.
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1. Contours of the Riba Proscription
Riba as currently understood is possibly the most difficult of the com-
mercial prohibitions contained in the shari'a to incorporate into modern
commercial practice. The prohibition of riba derives from several verses of
the Qur'an, the most prominent of which is verse 2:225, which reads:
Those who devour riba cannot rise ... [T]hat is because they say, bai' [sale]
is like riba. But Allah has allowed bai' and forbidden riba. Those who, after
receiving direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the past;
their case is for Allah (to judge); but those who repeat (the offense) are com-
panions of the Fire: They will abide therein (forever). 129
However, while the verse makes abundantly clear a vast conceptual differ-
ence between riba and bai', the contours of the terms themselves are almost
entirely undefined. The term riba has been variously translated as "unjus-
tified profit," "illicit gain," "usury" or, most broadly, "unlawful gain by way
of excess or deferment," which effectively would mean interest. 1 30 From
this and other verses, it is also clear that riba was a practice known in
Muhammad's lifetime (hence the reference to those who compare it favora-
bly to bai'), that it potentially involves enormous profit, 1 3 1 that it involves
some form of exploitation that can be compared to theft,1 3 2 and that its
opposite appears to be charity. 133 The Qur'an provides little guidance
beyond this.
The riba practice in Muhammad's time appears to have been a transac-
tion between lender and borrower, whereby the lender agrees to delay
repayment of a loan at the time of repayment in exchange for doubling of
the value of the loan. This explains the Qur'anic reference to "doubling
and redoubling" in verse 3:130.134 This practice is commonly known as
riba al-jahiliyya. Indeed, Ibn Abbas, Muhammad's cousin, reports a sound
hadith that the only riba is riba aljahiliyya. 13 5 Yet a second hadith reads as
follows:
Gold for gold, like for like, hand to hand and any excess is riba. Silver for
silver, like for like, hand to hand and any excess is riba; grain for grain, like
for like, hand to hand and any excess is riba; salt for salt, like for like, hand
to hand and any excess is riba; barley for barley, like for like, hand to hand
and any excess is riba; dates for dates, like for like, hand to hand, and any
excess is riba. And if the kinds differ, then sell as you wish, so long as it is
129. QUR'AN 2:225 (translated by author).
130. See, e.g., NOEL J. COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE GULF STATES 100 (1984);
NABIL A. SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE PROFIT IN ISLAMIC LAW 13 (1986).
131. See QUR'AN 3:130 ("Oh ye who believe, do not devour riba, making it double and
redouble . . .") (translated by author).
132. See id. 4:161 (promising a painful punishment for those who devour riba and
those who devour the property of others falsely).
133. See id. 30:39 ("And whatever you lay out as riba, so that it may increase in the
property of men, it shall not increase with Allah; and whatever you give in charity, desir-
ing Allah's pleasure, you shall get manifold.") (translated by author).
134. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 72-73; see also S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF
CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 268-69 (1991), see also SANHURI, supra note 120, at 241.
135. See id. at 222-23.
Cornell International Law Journal
hand to hand. 1 3 6
The two hadith on riba are not easily reconcilable, and Ibn Abbas, as
well as a few like minded Companions, appear to have maintained the
validity of his narrower definition of riba, though there are debatable
reports that he abandoned his claim when confronted with the broader
hadith.13 7 Yet these conflicting hadith are not to be ignored under the
modalities, given the centrality of the hadith to the development of legal
rules. As a result, Ibn Abbas' hadith was declared by juristic consensus to
be in some way misunderstood, and riba al-jahiliyya is, in light of the lan-
guage of the Ibn Abbas hadith, perhaps the strongest of several potential
forms of riba, but other forms exist. 138
The second hadith quoted above adds two categories of riba, one in
which certain hand to hand, or simultaneous, transactions result in a mate-
rial gain for one party, and one in which a transaction results in delayed
receipt on the part of one party. 139 The hadith only applies to six items,
and even then, only to trade within any particular item when excess values
are concerned. Yet the tool of qiyas as applied reductively within the
modalities took this relatively narrow rule and broadened it into a funda-
mental principle of considerable breadth, forbidding trade of various kinds
between items resembling those on the list unless the trade was simultane-
ous, or of equal value. 140 Classically, and in keeping with the terms of the
hadith, jurists obsessed primarily on the sales and trades prohibited by it,
not whether it encompassed loans. 14 1 However, Islamic finance has con-
136. SARAKHSI, supra note 93, at 110 (translated by author); SANHURI, supra note 120,
at 177 (translated by author). A similar version appears in the Risala as well. See RISALA,
supra note 70, 1 1518.
137. See SANHURI, supra note 120, at 222, 226.
138. See id. at 224-27 for classical references suggesting this. The idea that the Ibn
Abbas hadith is meant to suggest that riba al-jahiliyya is the strongest but not the exclu-
sive form of riba is not altogether impossible reasoning, given an Arabic idiomatic pecu-
liarity where the negation of the existence of all other types of an entity or style can
merely be an emphasis on the strength of that entity or style. For example, Muhammad
is known to have said that there is no youth except his son in law Ali, and no sword
except Ali's sword. Clearly Muhammad knew of the existence of other youth and other
swords, and the statement is meant more in praise of Ali's prowess than as a statement
of exclusion. See PHILIP K. HiTTi, HISTORY OF THE ARABS 183 (1937) (translating this
hadith as "no sword can match [Ali's] and no young warrior can compare with 'Ali!'").
139. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 74.
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., SANHURI, supra note 120, at 178-94. No consensus was ever reached on
the parameters of the relevant prohibited trade classifications in classical jurisprudence
once this hadith was expanded through qiyas. For example, jurists disagreed as to
whether the hadith, when expanded to a fundamental principle, should classify items by
weight and volume and prohibit delayed exchanges within each classification, as the
Hanafis and Hanbalis believed, or whether the hadith should classify items as currency
or preservable and non-preservable foodstuffs, as the Malikis maintained, or simply cur-
rency and foodstuffs, as the Shafi'i's maintained. See id. The inquiry is largely casuistic
and irrelevant for the purposes of this Article. However, it should be noted that there is
an exception to this rather broad restraint on trade based on a separate series of hadith
that permit a practice known as salam, or advance purchase of commodities if accompa-
nied by specific information and full advance payment. See MUHAMMAD IBN ISMA'IL
BUKHARI, 3 SAHIH AL-BUKHARi 35 (1990) ("The Messenger of Allah came to Madinah, and
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cluded that an ijma, based on this hadith, prohibits trades of not only gold
and silver but also of all other forms of currency, unless hand to hand and
without excess. 14 2 Thus, riba has become synonymous in the modern era
with interest of any kind on a loan, and jurists in Islamic finance routinely
dismiss any alternative conclusion, based on the employment of alternative
modalities, as "apologetic" or "defeatist."'143 Since the modality admits no
possibility for the community to be mistaken in reaching this ijma, the
found its inhabitants entering salam contracts in fruits for one, two, and three years. He
said: 'Whoever enters into a salam contract, let him specify a known volume or weight,
and a known term of deferment."') (translated by author); see also VOGEL & HAYES, supra
note 6, at 74, 139; see also SANHURI, supra note 120, at 35, 190.
142. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 77; see also SALEH, supra note 130, at 48.
Classical references seem to support this conclusion to some extent. See, e.g., IBN
QUDAMAH, supra note 128, at 436 (declaring an ijma on the subject). Ibn Qudamah and
the prominent Hanafi jurist, Sarakhsi, both also report a hadith that prohibits a loan
with a benefit. See id.; see also SARAKHSI, supra note 93, at 35. The latter hadith, however,
is of arguable validity given particular problems with the isnad. See VOGEL & HAYES,
supra note 6, at 77. In addition, it should be noted that loans were considered charitable
acts in the early Islamic period, and the notion of a loan with a benefit would therefore
probably be considered odious to Muslims in the classical period. See, e.g., IBN
QUDAMAH, supra note 128, at 429-30 (discussing the ethereal rewards given to those who
offer interest free loans to their fellow Muslims in need).
143. See, e.g., Mohammad Uzair, Impact of Interest Free Banking, 1 J. ISt.AMIC BANKING
& FIN. 39, 40 (1984) ("By this time, there is a complete consensus of all... schools...
and among Islamic economists that interest in all forms, of all kinds, and for all pur-
poses is completely prohibited in Islam. Gone are the days when people were apologetic
about Islam, and contended that the interest for commercial and business purposes, as
presently charged by the banks, was not prohibited by Islam."); UsMANI, supra note 24, at
111 (describing the position permitting some forms of interest as "defeatist"); COUNCIL
OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, Report of the Council of Islamic Ideology
on the Elimination of Interest from the Economy, in CONSOLIDATED RECOMMENDATIONS ON
THE ISLAMIC ECONOMIC SYSTEM 7 (1983) (indicating the presence of "complete unanimity
among all schools of thought in Islam that the term riba stands for interest in all its
types and forms"); ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAM1C BANKING AND INTEREST 50 (describing this
position as "dominant" and "the basis of Islamic banking theory as well as practice");
CHAPRA, supra note 25, at 63. This position has come under attack by some modern
reformist-minded jurists using anti-formalist hermerieutical techniques. See, e.g.,
SANHURI, supra note 120, at 219-49; Chibli Mallat, The Debate on Riba and Interest in
Twentieth Century Jurisprudence, in ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE 69, 8--81 (Chibli Mallat
ed., 1988). This is discussed further in Part IV, but the point here is that anti-formalist
interpretive modalities are not entirely extinct. However, the dominance of the Langdel-
lian position and the marginalization of the various anti-formalist modalities of modern
reformers should not be understated. The Egyptian Constitutional Court, when asked
to rule on the issue of whether the Civil Code's provision of interest violated the shari'a,
adopted neither the riba interpretations of Sanhuri, the drafter of the Civil Code, nor of
Rashid Ridha and Muhammad Abdu, both respected reformist Islamic scholars working
at one of the most prestigious Islamic centers of learning in the modern world. Instead,
the Court accepted the notion that interest on loans was indeed riba and therefore
banned by the shari'a, but then contended that the constitutional amendment that
demanded all laws conform to the shari'a was not intended to apply in any meaningful
way to legislation enacted prior to its adoption. See Rector of the Azhar University v.
President of the Republic, Judicial Year No. 1, Case No. 20 (Sup. Const. Ct. 1985)
(Egypt), reprinted in W. M. Ballantyne, Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt)-Shari'a
and Riba, 1 ARAB L.Q. 100 (1985). That the Court preferred this type of legalistic non-
sense to the adoption of a coherent anti-formalist position on riba speaks volumes about
the virtually exclusive control that the Langdellian modalities have in deriving the sub-
stance of the shari'a.
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derived rule is unassailable and will haunt Islamic finance for as long as it
continues to cling to its Langdellian ways.
2. Gharar
Unlike riba, whose foundational elements are contained within the
Qur'an, the jurisprudential doctrine of gharar, or risk, is nowhere men-
tioned in the Qur'an, and the verses from which it is derived form an atten-
uated justification for it through the prohibition of maysar, or games of
chance. 1 4 4 The most often cited verses are 5:90-91,145 which read as
follows:
0 you who believe! Intoxicants and maysar, sacrifices for idols and divina-
tion by arrows are an abomination, the work of Satan, so avoid them so that
you may be successful.
By means of intoxicants and maysar Satan only wants to sow enmity and
hatred among you and take you from the remembrance of Allah and prayer,
so will you not abstain?14 6
The juxtaposition of maysar with alcohol, activities of divination,
throwing arrows, and sowing enmity and hatred and creating some dis-
tance between the believers and the worship of God, does not indicate that
maysar was meant to address more than standard forms of gambling. That
the Langdellian modalities would expand this prohibition to encompass
significant levels of risk in modern financial and commercial transactions
seems astonishing and entirely incongruent with the verse.
However, the hadith on the subject do forbid high levels of uncertainty
in commercial transactions despite the incongruity. A variety of hadith for-
bid the sale of unripe fruit on a tree, the sperm of a stallion, the fetus of a
camel, grapes until they are black, or grain until it is strong.14 7 Applying
qiyas to these and related hadith, the Langdellian modalities have derived a
series of rules concerning gharar that stringently limit levels of uncertainty
in contemporary commercial transactions. 14 8 All of these have been rati-
fied and consecrated as immutable rules under the doctrine of ijma. 149
The two central fundamental principles involving gharar are a prohibi-
tion against the sale of an item not currently in existence,' 5 0 and a ban on
144. See SALEH, supra note 130, at 85.
145. See, e.g., VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 64; SALEH, supra note 130, at 62.
146. QUR'AN 5:90-91 (translated by author). A similar verse appears in 2:219, where
maysar and intoxicants are said to have both benefit and sin, but that the sin exceeds the
benefit. See id. 2:219.
147. See IBN RUSHD, 2 THE DISTINGUISHED JURIST'S PRIMER [BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID] 179-
80 (Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee trans., 1996). This is another example of an area in
which the doctrine of istihsan has provided marginal levels of interpretive flexibility in
the classical era. For example, some jurists recognize the doctrine permitting the sale of
fruit on a branch so long as it is cut imminently and ripens fully after its cutting. See
SARAKHSI, supra note 93, at 197.
148. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 87-95.
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., SANHURi, supra note 120, at 31 ("[A]nd thus we find that there is an ijma
among the schools of thought that if an object is not at all in existence at the time of
contracting, then the contract is void.") (translated by author); VOGEL & HAYES, supra
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all significant uncertainties in a contract, such as any uncertainty over cost
or duration. 15 1 The effect of these prohibitions, and particularly the ban
on uncertainties, is commercially devastating.
There are two exceptions to the prohibition of gharar, one developed
as a result of a contradictory hadith, and the other derived from an applica-
tion of istihsan in the classical era and extended by modern Islamic
finance. 152 As to the first exception, advance purchases, known as salam,
were permitted by Prophetic hadith'5 3 so long as they did not pertain to
particular objects and were generic or abstract sales.15 4 The delivery of
cash for the purchase had to be immediate. A bilateral executory contract,
where the seller agreed to purchase at a later date and the buyer agreed to
buy at that date, was invalid. 155 The second exception related to a concept
known as istisna, pursuant to which parties contract for the manufacture of
particular goods not in existence at the time of contract formation.' 56 The
doctrine exists, and has existed classically, through the doctrine of istihsan,
making it a very limited exception to the prohibition against sales of non-
existent objects.' 5 7
note 6, at 91. This is reflected in classical texts as well. See, e.g., IBN RUSHD, supra note
147, at 124 ("[T]hus all of the jurists have reached an ijma that [the sale of fruit prior to
its appearance] is forbidden because it is the sale of an item not created.") (translated by
author).
151. See SANHURI, supra note 120, at 49. Thus, a price pegged to a varying index or a
lease contract that imposes largely unknown liabilities on a lessee falls well within the
bounds of prohibited gharar in Islamic finance. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 93,
144. Classical jurists, for their part, tended to classify gharar as being either large or
small, with scholars agreeing generally that the large form was prohibited and the
smaller form permitted. See, e.g., IBN RUSHD, supra note 147, at 175-77 (comparing
schools of law with respect to great and small forms of gharar); cf. SANHURI, supra note
120, at 47 (quoting other classical jurists who include a third form, moderate gharar,
about which there is disagreement as to its permissibility). There was considerable disa-
greement about what constitutes large gharar and small gharar. See IBN RUSHD, supra
note 147, at 175-81. However, the prohibited large form generally inheres in contracts
of sale or other profit-based contracts (as opposed to gratuitous contracts or contracts of
marriage) when it has a large effect on the contract. See SANHURI, supra note 120, at 49.
Thus, jurists disagreed on whether the non-presence of an existing object, fully
described at the time of sale, would create a form of gharar as large or small, with some
arguing that the non-presence has no effect on the contract, and others, such as Shafi'i,
insisting that it does. See IBN RUSHD, supra note 147, at 177-78.
152. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 89.
153. See supra note 141.
154. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 89. Thus, for example, the immediate
purchase of a certain number of bushels of wheat was permitted, but not wheat from a
particular field. See id. Other rules also existed, requiring precise specifications on
weight and type, for example. See SANHURI, supra note 120, at 34.
155. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 89.
156. See SANHURI, supra note 120, at 38. This existed in the classical era as well. See
ABU BAKR IBN MAS'UD KASANI, 7 BADA'i AL-SANA'I FI TARTIB AL-SHARA'! 2167-69 (Zakariya 'Ali
Yusif ed., 1968)
157. See SANHURI, supra note 120, at 38-39. The majority of classical Hanafi jurists
held istisna contracts to be non-binding in their entirety until the goods had been manu-
factured and the buyer had the opportunity to inspect them. See KASANI, supra note 156,
at 3168-69 (indicating that the non-binding nature of istisna derives directly from the
fact that it is a product of judicial preference and departs from the rule of qiyas). How-
ever, there was a minority opinion from the early Hanafi jurist, Abu Yusuf, holding that
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III. The Failures of Islamic Commercial Jurisprudence-The
Consequences of Langdellianism
A. Original Conceptions
The foundational element of the alternative fairness-based architec-
ture, which the proponents of Islamic finance first envisaged as complying
with the rules of gharar and riba under their modalities, was the
mudharaba, an Islamic form of passive partnership. 15 8 In a mudharaba,
passive investors place their capital in a venture, other participants contrib-
ute only their labor, profits are distributed first to the investors until their
investment is recouped, and the remaining profits are then distributed
based on an agreed upon percentage. 15 9 Those contributing their labor
would bear no capital risk. 16 0
As originally envisaged, Muslims would passively "invest" in the
Islamic "banks" through deposits, and the banks would then invest as pas-
sive partners in various ventures. 16 1 Profits from the ventures would be
distributed to the partners of the Islamic bank and the managers of the
ventures based on an agreed upon percentage. 162 Thus, this model would
avoid debt and derive all profits derived from genuine gain. Passive part-
ners would exclusively bear all losses.' 6 3
Unfortunately, as might be expected of a legal system developed with
scant concern for discretionary preference or practical reality, this model is
commercially unworkable as an alternative to the conventional bank sys-
tem because it offers neither the liquidity nor the minimal risk of loss that
would be expected of a bank. 164 For example, private equity funds cur-
rently operate on principles of limited partnership very similar to those
envisaged by the early Islamic financiers. 165 However, because of the con-
istisna contracts were binding at the time of the offer, not acceptance, considering the
hardship that would exist if either party refused to enter into the contract after the goods
had been manufactured. See id. at 3169.
158. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 130-31; see also SIDDIQI, supra note 26, at 86;
see also UsmAI, supra note 24, at 10. Sadr seems to have adopted this principle as well.
See AL-BANK, supra note 17, at 154 (indicating that the first principle of lending policy
should be the transformation of loans into partnership transactions where possible).
159. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 109-10.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 131; see also WARDE, supra note 9, at 135-36; see also AL-BANK, supra
note 17, at 154.
162. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 131; see also WARDE, supra note 9, at 135-36;
see also AL-BANK, supra note 17, at 154.
163. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 109-10.
164. As to whether or not such a system, even if it were somehow workable, is neces-
sarily fairer than interest-based banking, there can be considerable doubt. The financial
institution would only be entitled to share in gains in the venture, but given that there
are few limitations on the percentage of profits that an investor may earn in a venture,
the transaction could be considerably less equitable than debt. See VOGEL & HAYES,
supra note 6, at 81; see also Kuran, supra note 28, at 178. For example, an entrepreneur
may well regard a 6% guaranteed return to a bank as considerably fairer than a 90:10
division of profit in favor of an investor.
165. For more detailed information on the structure of private equity funds, see JAMES
M. SCHELL, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS § 301 (2000). In
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siderab!e risk of loss, annualized internal rates of return to the passive lim-
ited partners are expected to net significantly higher gains than investment
in a bank.166 Moreover, Islamic banks would have less liquidity than con-
ventional banks if they relied solely on mudharaba. For example, if deposi-
tors at an Islamic bank react to unexpected losses by rushing to withdraw
their funds, then an Islamic bank would have no recourse to quick liquidity
through discounting current debt obligations or borrowing from a central
bank with interest.16 7
Another difficulty in using the mudharaba paradigm is that banks do
not generally have the capacity to monitor their many investments in ven-
tures. 168 Again, juxtaposing the paradigm of the private equity fund,
funds generally deeply involve themselves in the management of the few
underlying ventures in which they invest, and the funds also demand sig-
nificant shareholder rights, such as a director's seat, veto over significant
changes to the business, rights to review financial records, and rights to
purchase the interest of any other investor seeking to dispose of his invest-
ment. 16 9 Commercial banks generally do not engage in this type of costly
exercise because they are guaranteed a fixed return on their investment in
the form of an interest payment. 170 If an Islamic bank were to engage in
the same extensive and costly practices as an equity fund with respect to
every investment made, it would raise its costs substantially, severely com-
promising its ability to compete with commercial banks. 17 ' However, if it
chose to forego this, the bank would expose itself to the possibility that
financial records were being falsified, or at least accounting standards
interpreted in a way that minimized distributed profits. 17 2 There is some
evidence that this is precisely what happened to early Islamic banks that
attempted to apply the mudharaba model. 17 3
It is possible that the financial institution could avoid these problems
simply by investing in highly liquid, low risk, and low return equities,
much as a "money market" fund tends to do, but then it would not serve
addition, the author has had extensive experience in the structuring and deployment of
private equity funds.
166. See id. §§ 2.02-2.04. Most private equity funds require that revenue first be dis-
tributed exclusively to the limited partner investors, not only to the extent of their invest-
ment, but also to a preferred return level of approximately 6 to 7%. See id. § 2.03. Fund
managers are entitled only to profits, ironically and misleadingly termed "carried inter-
est," above this level at a specified percentage, usually 20%. See id. § 2.02.
167. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 134.
168. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 135; see also Timur Kuran, The Economic
System in Contemporary Islamic Thought, 18 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 135, 153 (1986).
169. See generally Schell, supra note 165, §§ 1.01-1.07. Admittedly, private equity
funds at times insist on some of these provisions, and, in particular, seats on the board
of directors for regulatory reasons unrelated to monitoring. See id. § 8.06(4).
170. See id. Commercial banks may seek some control over key decision-making with
respect to parts of a venture, such as a sale of the business, particularly for larger loans.
However, the level of control is generally much smaller than it would be for a private
equity fund.
171. See id.
172. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 135.
173. See id.
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the market role that a bank would. A bank as a financial intermediary is
supposed to overcome particular market failures concerning economies of
scale, information asymmetry, and liquidity mismatches that would other-
wise develop. It collects the funds of many unsophisticated depositors who
need quick access to their funds and uses expertise and specialized skills
to identify and monitor to some extent its portfolio, earning interest from
the portfolio and having sufficient ready liquid cash on hand to satisfy the
requirements of its depositors. 174 If it were to forgo these opportunities
and merely act as a money market fund, it would never be a substitute for a
conventional bank, and conventional banks would continue to be
necessary.
B. Alternative Approaches Within the Langdellian Modalities
Given the foregoing, Islamic financial institutions have found them-
selves in an existential crisis that has lasted to this day. The entire founda-
tion upon which the institutions had expected to rest, the mudharaba, had
proved incapable of sustaining them, and no ready alternative methodol-
ogy was apparent.
Moreover, given the Langdellian modalities within which contempo-
rary Islamic jurisprudence willfully imprisoned itself, the flexibility neces-
sary to develop an alternative legal architecture responsive to the
commercial demands of the modern era was severely limited. The doc-
trines of riba and gharar had been developed through strict application of
these modalities. Little could be changed by an application of the same
reductive methodology, and, in any event, many of the rules had been con-
firmed by ijma with only a few exceptions, most of them casuistic. 175 The
fundamental principles had been laid, and they could not sustain a sensi-
ble commercial jurisprudence. The doctrines and the modalities that gave
rise to them needed to be abandoned, or at least fundamentally
reconsidered.
Islamic commercial jurisprudence has not risen to this challenge.
Rather than address the problem directly by seeking an alternative system
that is cognizant of commercial reality and sensitive to populist demands
for social justice, Islamic financial institutions have largely fallen back on
obfuscation, complication, and implicit deception. Islamic financial insti-
tutions rely primarily on three basic commercial structures, 17 6 and each is
an artifice. In addition, discussed below is the problem of insurance, a
vitally important commercial arrangement that clearly falls within the
prohibitions of gharar and riba according to Islamic finance practitioners..
174. See Mahmoud El-Gamal, Islamic Bank Corporate Governance and Regulation: A
Call for Mutualization, at 7, available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/files/
IBCGR.pdf.
175. See EI-Gamal, supra note 15.
176. See generally VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 138-49.
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1. Murabaha
Murabaha is the principal tool of the Islamic financial institution. By
one estimate, approximately 80-95% of the funds of Islamic financial insti-
tutions are employed in murabaha transactions. 177 A murabaha is basically
the sale of an item with a fully disclosed markup. 178 As used by financial
institutions, however, the murabaha is effectively an artifice through which
interest may be charged without falling afoul of the prohibition of riba. A
financial institution purchases some asset and simultaneously sells it to
the effective borrower at a higher price. 17 9 The borrower's payment is
delayed for the desired term, with the price to the ultimate purchaser
reflecting the prevailing market interest rate. 180 The final step of the trans-
action in some cases is that the borrower sells the asset to recover what is
effectively the loan principal.
The sole legal difference between this resale of an asset and an inter-
est-based transaction relates to ownership of and liability for the asset dur-
ing the time of transfer. However, these differences are obliterated by
provisions in murabaha transactions that declare the sale to the effective
borrower as occurring simultaneously with the first purchase by the
Islamic financial institution. 18 1 The borrower also waives all claims
against the financial institution for breach of warranty, and the financial
institution assigns all of its similar rights as the original purchaser to the
borrower.' 8 2 As might be expected, the murabaha usually involves the
purchase and sale of a readily resalable commodity, so that all connection
to the asset purchased is illusory.' 8 3
To expound on an example set forth by Vogel and Hayes, if a borrower
sought credit from a conventional bank in the amount of $50,000 at an
interest rate of 8.5%, with repayment to be made in nine equal monthly
installments, she would be required to pay $5,754.17 per month.18 4 Alter-
natively, she could go to an Islamic financial institution and purchase
stock in IBM currently valued at $50,000 while agreeing to pay for them in
nine monthly installments of $5,754.17. The bank's purchase of the stock
from the market would be simultaneous with her purchase of the stock.
She could then have a broker (perhaps employed at the same financial
institution) sell the stock immediately thereafter and deposit the $50,000
into her account. In an increasingly popular variant of the murabaha,
known as tawarruq, the borrower would sell the purchased asset back to
177. See WARDE, supra note 9, at 133; see also VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 198.
178. See WARDE, supra note 9, at 140.
179. See id. at 140-41.
180. See id. at 139. Banks are often eager to appear not to be engaged in such obvious
artifice and seek to disguise their murabaha transactions in a slightly less vulgar man-
ner. Id. (indicating the reluctance of Islamic financial institutions to make explicit refer-
ences to prevailing interest rates despite their reliance on them).
181. See id. at 141.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 143.
184. See id. at 177.
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the original seller from whom the bank purchased it. 185
Given the obvious transparency of most murabaha transactions, they
have proven somewhat controversial. Many jurists have denounced them,
at least in their current form, and the Fiqh Academy of the Organization of
Islamic Conference, probably the dominant Islamic jurisprudential author-
ity with respect to matters of finance, has shown some discomfort with the
approach even as it has sanctioned it. 18 6 The Gulf Cooperation Council
has been considerably more flexible, sanctioning both the murabaha and
its tawarruq manifestations. 18 7 Few within the Islamic finance community
would describe the murabaha as entirely violative of Islamic law; Islamic
financial institutions could not at this point survive without it.
2. Ijara
Ijara, or lease, transactions represent a rapidly growing segment of the
Islamic finance sector.'38 Ijara is barely less transparent than the
murabaha, and conceptually similar to a conventional lease in that it per-
mits a bank to purchase an item and lease it to a third party at whatever
price the lessor and the lessee deem fit.'8 9 Three theoretical differences
arise between ijara and conventional interest-based financing, but all three
are ignored in Islamic commercial arrangements, often in clear contraven-
tion of the shari'a.
First, a floating interest loan would be impossible, as uncertainties in
price at the time of contracting would violate the gharar prohibition. To
avoid this, banks routinely offer renewable leases with the lease value shift-
ing to conform to the prevailing interest rate at each renewal. 190 Though
either party can in theory cancel the renewable lease, in practice, this is
never the case and commercial actors rely on business reputation, internal
understandings and non-binding good faith agreements indicating that the
lease will be periodically renewed. 19 ' When these informal understand-
ings are not enough, Islamic commercial actors simply draft the provisions
they prefer, in this case compulsory renewals of the lease, and select a law
to govern the arrangement that is not the shari'a.19 2 This is exceedingly
common, 19 3 even if a highly disingenuous, hypocritical, and obfuscatory
measure given the professed desire to practice a specifically Islamic form of
commerce.
185. See supra note 5.
186. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 143; see also MUHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI,
ISSUES IN IsLAMIC BANKING 49 (1983); SALEH, supra note 130, at 118-19.
187. E1-Gamal, supra note 5, at 9.
188. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 144.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 263; see also Moghul & Ahmed, supra note 2, at 189-90 ("[Plarties to
Islamic finance transactions often assert English or New York law as the governing law
on the probability that the contracts are more likely to be enforced as written.").
193. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 263; see also Moghul & Ahmed, supra note
2, at 189-90.
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Second, gharar also requires ijara arrangements to be cancellable at
will because of the uncertainty in the future value of the leased prop-
erty.194 This problem is addressed the same way as a renewable lease-by
contracting in violation of the shari'a or by relying on business reputation
and an informal understanding. 195
A third and final difference is that the lessor, as the owner of the prop-
erty, must be responsible for all expenses related to its upkeep, on the the-
ory that gharar prohibits placing an uncertain obligation of this sort on the
lessee. 196 Again, commercial actors routinely ignore this rule and either
require the lessee to pay for the upkeep or purchase casualty insurance. 19 7
Neither of these options complies with the rules established by the
Langdellian modalities. 198
3. Istisna'/Salam
Istisna' is a limited exception developed through istihsan to the
prohibitions on the sale of nonexistent objects as derived by qiyas and
ijma'.199 The broader type of advance purchase permitted by a specific
hadith was salam, or full advance payment for a generic product to be deliv-
ered at a later time. Thus, istisna', with its more flexible payment terms,
did not cover the more general products that were permitted under the
doctrine of salam, as it dealt exclusively with manufacture. 20 0 Moreover,
because it is based on the discretionary istihsan, it is supposed to be used
very sparingly. 20 1 However, Islamic financiers have reversed the presump-
tion, and activities permitted under istisna' are now the rule rather than the
exception. 20 2 As a result, they now use the terms salam and istisna' nearly
interchangeably, applying the rules of istisna' to both.20 3 This approach is
particularly ironic given the apparent reluctance of Islamic financiers gen-
erally to overhaul the underlying Langdellian bases that have relegated
istihsan to such a minor role in the development of Islamic jurisprudence.
If the anti-formalist tool of istihsan is permitted to do such considerable
violence to the fundamental Langdellian principle derived from the Pro-
phetic hadith that the sale of nonexistent objects is prohibited, then one
wonders why it could not also be used, for example, to do equal or lesser
violence to the prohibitions against interest.
In any event, istisna' permits a financial institution to request the con-
struction of a particular item, such as a house, and to pay for it in, for
194. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 144.
195. See id. at 145.
196. See id. at 144.
197. See id. at 145.
198. See id. at 150.
199. See RAYNER, supra note 134, at 27, 137-38.
200. This is obvious from the definition of the term istisna, which means, "to have
someone make something." WEHR, supra note 93, at 615.
201. See SANHuRI, supra note 120, at 38.
202. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 146-47.
203. See id. at 146-49.
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example, three annual installments. 20 4 A second istisna' could then be
concluded selling that same house to a prospective homeowner through a
longer series of monthly installments extending, for example, over 25
years. 20 5 This arrangement renders any profit or risk sharing on the part
of the financial institution entirely illusory, as it is in all material respects a
fixed interest mortgage. 20 6
4. A Problem of Insurance
As derived under the Langdellian modalities, the prohibition against
insurance is firm and absolute, according to practitioners of Islamic
finance. Commercial insurance both involves indirect investment in riba,
as most insurance companies place a large amount of their funds in inter-
est bearing accounts, and, more importantly, it involves payment of premi-
ums in exchange for a sum that may or may not ever be received based on
an entirely unpredictable future contingent event.20 7
Islamic finance has developed an artifice known as a takaful, or soli-
darity, contract to circumvent the prohibition. 20 8 Takaful derives from the
determination by some scholars that gratuitous contracts are exempt from
the rules of gharar.20 9 Pursuant to takaful, a group of Muslims agrees to
protect its members in the case of casualty or loss by pooling their
resources through making regular payments, in the form of premiums, to
be invested in Islamically acceptable commercial products. 2 10 The scheme
then functions in theory as an Islamic financial institution would, with
"profits" shared amongst the beneficiaries and the providers. 2 1 1 When a
casualty or loss occurs, the participants each "gift" a portion of the asset
pool to the bearer of the loss. 2 12
204. See id. at 146-47.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 150. The gharar violation is more fundamental, as insurance compa-
nies presumably could avoid the receipt of riba more readily than they could the uncer-
tainty that constitutes their reason for existence. It should be noted, however, that some
have argued that even under current concepts of gharar, insurance is permissible
because it is not the payment of premiums in the hope of receiving a payoff in the future,
but rather payment for a particular, certain service that is easily valued, avoidance of
risk. This is akin, under such a formulation, to paying a guard to protect one's goods. It
suffices to say for purposes of this Article, however, that this position has not gathered
very much support at all within the Islamic finance community. See Vogel and Haes,
supra note 6, at 150 (referencing work of Mustafa Zarqa).
208. See id. at 151.
209. See id. at 151. For a classical reference, see IBN RUSHD, supra note 147, at 399
("[A]lI which cannot be sold legitimately from the standpoint of gharar [may be
gifted].").
210. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 151-52.
211. See MOHD. MA'SUM BILLAH, PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES OF TAKAFUL AND INSURANCE
COMPARED 25 (2001).
212. See id. Many seemingly respected advocates of Islamic finance strive mightily to
find alternative grounds upon which the doctrine of tahaful might be grounded. See
generally Mohd. Ma'sum Billah, Sources of Law Affecting 'Takaful', 2 INT'L J. ISLtAMIC FIN.
SERVICES 4, available at http://islamic-finance.net/journals/journal8/mmbillahvol2no4.
pdf. These grounds vary from a Prophetic recommendation that one take precautionary
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This approach is problematic for several reasons. First, the gift seems
to require that an offeror be bound before the identity of the receiver of the
gift or the value of the gift is even known, a difficult proposition to sustain
as a general matter. 2 13 Second, the notion of a group of friendly and
brotherly Muslims agreeing to support each other in times of need becomes
especially difficult to sustain as economies of scale increase in size, and the
number of participants grows so that they no longer have any personal or
commercial relationship with each other. However, most importantly,
institutions offering takaful products are not acting gratuitously. 2 14 The
donations made by the participants in the scheme function in all respects
like Islamic banking accounts. This disingenuous reference to charitable
activity is inherently deceptive to prospective purchasers of the product
and potentially damaging to regulatory frameworks in the operable juris-
dictions. This is a for profit contract, and a straightforward application of
the rules of gharar must invalidate it if the modalities are taken seriously.
In some cases, this descent into jurisprudential delusion is taken a
step further. Islamic financial institutions often purchase general commer-
cial insurance on the grounds that takaful insurance is not available to the
extent that the bank needs it, and commercial necessity demands that
some form of insurance be available. 2 15 Otherwise, the bank justifies the
purchase on the grounds that commercial insurance itself can be consid-
ered a form of takaful.2 16 The former approach is essentially an admission
that the Langdellian modalities have failed to address commercial realities
despite their willingness to employ the most transparent of techniques to
achieve standard financial objectives. The latter approach is even less
grounded in commercial realities, as a legal doctrine that relies on the clas-
measures to ensure that a camel does not flee to Prophetic blessings upon those who
remove hardships from Muslim brothers. See id. By and large, none of them is sensible
enough to rebut, other than to indicate that they deal with recommended measures that
have absolutely nothing to do with gharar. One of the most popular alternative grounds
appears to be based upon the Muslim penal doctrine known as aqilah, pursuant to
which particular members of a tribe are jointly responsible for the payment of blood
money to the family of a victim killed by the tribe. See id.; see also BILLAH, supra note
211, at 3-6; Yon Bahiah Wan Aris, Takaful-An Option to Conventional Insurance: A
Malaysian Model (2004), available at http://www.icmif.org/2k4takaful/site/documents/
an%20option%20to%20conventional%20insurance.pdf; Muhammad Ayub, Takaful- An
Alternative to Insurance, available at http://www.sbp.org.pk/departments/ibd/Takaful.
pdf. Precisely what such an obligation in the penal law has to do with contractual rules
concerning gharar mystifies the author, and the fact that respected Islamic professors
and directors of banking operations make such logically fatuous claims demonstrates
the Islamic banking community's discomfort with the bases upon which the practice of
takaful rests.
213. This approach certainly would violate the classical rules concerning gifts, which
require at least an offer and acceptance by a known individual of a known object. See
IBN RUSHD, supra note 147, at 361.
214. Takaful contracts are generally offered by large financial institutions in the
Islamic world. See, e.g., International Cooperative and Mutual Insurance Federation,
Takaful Directory, http://www.icmif.org/2k4takaful/site/directory.asp.
215. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 6, at 152. The Islamic Development Bank, per-
haps the world's largest Islamic bank, adopts this approach. See id.
216. See id.
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sification of standard commercial insurance providers as charitable institu-
tions is patently absurd.
C. Langdellianism and Islamic Finance
In their consequential failures, Langdellianism and Islamic jurispru-
dential theory mirror each other almost entirely. Part I of this Article men-
tioned four primary causes for the fall of Langdellianism: (1) failure to
articulate its own ontological constituent units; (2) inability to admit the
possibility of inconsistent rules within the modality which necessarily
resulted in judicial discretion; (3) separation from the experiential realities
in which the law operates, leading to willful abandonment of its principles
by judges and juries alike; and (4) imperviousness to change in a rapidly
changing social and economic environment. All of these, save the first, are
equally applicable in the Islamic context.
Proponents of the modalities will often apply doctrines in wildly
inconsistent manners. For example, they will decry as defeatist or apolo-
getic any suggestion that istihsan, or any other doctrine, should be used to
exempt money loans from a hadith that deals fundamentally with trades of
items, such as precious metals and foodstuffs, which are not the contempo-
rary basis of currency. Yet proponents permit the practice of istisna, all but
obliterating the former fundamental principle that sales of nonexistent
objects are forbidden, which is a far greater use of istihsan.2 17 The quasi-
scientific approach appears not to provide the level of certainty intended.
When this implicit discretion is insufficient to achieve a desired result,
even proponents of the modalities will ignore the methodological princi-
ples to which they claim obedience. This departure from legal require-
ments might be achieved directly, by requiring a lessee to pay for upkeep of
property he leases notwithstanding the Islamic prohibition, or indirectly,
by creating such nonsensical concepts as charitable insurance. In either
event, as with Langdell in the American context, the modalities are often
unworkable and consequently unheeded despite claims of adherence to
them.
Finally, the Islamic Langdellian modalities are impervious to the types
of changes required to develop a sensible commercial jurisprudence. The
rules of riba and gharar are now ironclad through reductive understand-
ings of ijma and cannot be altered without abandoning the modality. As a
217. These stark inconsistencies often arise from the fact that the modern proponents
of Islamic finance tend to presume all classical jurists have applied the Langdellian
modalities faithfully, and, in a process known as takhayyur, pick and choose among
disparate classical rules, like spare parts at a junkyard, selecting that which seems more
convenient and in keeping with commercial reality. See An-Na'im, supra note 124, at 45
(describing takhayyur). For example, as the classical Hanafi jurist, Kasani, provides for
the practice of istisna in his writings, proponents of Islamic finance accept and substan-
tially expand the practice. See KASANI, supra note 156; see also Muhammad AI-Bashir
Muhammad Al-Amine, Istisna' and its Application in Islamic Banking, 16 ARAB L.Q. 22
(2001). Compare supra note 128 (discussing a late classical rule with no basis for sup-
port in the Langdellian modalities that is nonetheless relied upon by proponents of
Islamic financ).
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result, jurists continue to struggle with concepts as basic as insurance and
interest on debt, developing extensive artifices to address them while the
modern commercial world races ahead with financial and commercial
innovations far more complex. The author does not doubt that further arti-
fice and fiction may develop to deal with commercial innovation. However,
it will become less and less clear what the benefits of Langdellian jurispru-
dential theory precisely are, while the increasing transaction costs caused
by the unnecessary complexity will surely come under hightened scrutiny.
Those who looked to Islamic finance to create a more just and equitable
system will no doubt begin to look elsewhere, as the shari'a developed
under the Langdellian hermeneutic is not meeting the needs of Muslims.
TV. Alternative Approaches
The task remains to determine whether the shari'a can play a salutary
role in the commercial lives of the Muslim body politic, and, if so, exactly
what type of jurisprudential approach should replace the Langdellian
modality that currently dominates. 218
Continuing the comparison to American intellectual and academic tra-
dition further than this Article has so far could invite something akin to the
more extreme forms of American Legal Realism in the Islamic juristic tradi-
tion. Such an approach would consider doctrine entirely irrelevant to rule-
making, rendering questions as to whether a particular transaction were
riba or bai an exercise in "transcendental nonsense." 2 19 Jurisprudence of
this sort would pay heed solely to policy-based notions of fairness and
social justice, social, political and commercial reality, and whatever other
factors, including personal biases and prejudices, might matter to the deci-
sion-maker. This would not be likely to succeed in the Islamic world.220
Muslims, as a general matter, probably would not ignore all of traditional
Islamic doctrine in fashioning a code of conduct. Most Muslims would
probably regard an approach that advocated a complete departure from the
Qur'an and the hadith as entirely illegitimate from an Islamic perspective,
regardless whether it reflected notions of fairness and social justice.2 2 1
218. Realistically, modern commercially successful nations will not reformulate their
entire banking structures on Islamic principles at any point in the near future, regardless
of how those principles are defined. However, as is currently the case in Malaysia,
nations could very well tolerate, and even encourage, a separate Islamic financial system
operating alongside the conventional one. See WARDE, supra note 9, at 123. The current
section therefore contemplates the possibility of such a parallel approach.
219. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REv. 809, 820 (1935).
220. Cf. Jackson, supra note 38 (developing an approach drawn largely from Roberto
Unger and Stanley Fish).
221. Of course, this approach would be somewhat marginal within the judiciary in
the American context as well, because total disregard for the orthodox bases on which
judges render decisions, such as sound interpretation of constitutional text, is hardly
characteristic of the manner in which most opinions are written. Professor Fletcher
properly points out that American legal culture tends to view the Constitution as similar
to a religious text in many ways, such as its reluctance to seek amendments, its refusal to
delete amended text even when the text is offensive to modern sensibilities, and its his-
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In light of this, it is important to establish principles for alternative
approaches towards Islamic finance that would ensure both credibility and
achievement of ontological objectives. 22 2 These would lay the groundwork
for, but would not establish in exact detail, alternative methodologies.
Four basic principles are apparent, and each is discussed in turn.
A. Qur'anic Maxims
The methodology necessary to reformulate Islamic finance could and
should claim strict adherence to the Qur'an's text. Given the lack of defini-
tion afforded to riba, the Qur'an's passages present no obstacle to a sensi-
ble jurisprudence that harmonizes commercial reality with some modicum
of social justice. In fact, the prohibition of riba can contribute to the crea-
tion of a social justice framework. Other verses that permit commerce,
urge believers to honor their contracts, and forbid games of chance seem
equally salutary standing on their own, posing no impediment to the crea-
tion of a sound modern economy. 22 3
toric internal battles between literalists and those who seek to follow the spirit rather
than the letter of the text. See George P. Fletcher, Three Nearly Sacred Books in Western
Law, 54 ARK. L. REv. 1, 3-8 (2001).
222. The approach herein is primarily jurisprudential, advocating alternative means
of developing legal doctrine to serve functional ends. The author would be remiss for
this Article not to mention parallel efforts by the economist Professor El-Gamal to
develop economic proposals to conform to what EI-Gamal describes as the "spirit" of the
riba and gharar prohibitions. EI-Gamal, supra note 174, at 12-15. Professor El-Gamal
argues that a solution for Islamic banks and insurance companies would be to adopt the
mutual form, where the depositors are themselves the shareholders to the extent of their
deposits. Id. at 15. The managers of mutual institutions avoid excessive and potentially
exploitative risk-taking in commercial transactions because they face no need to raise
stock prices. Id. While there is much to be said in favor of EI-Gamal's ideas, gaps in his
ideas exist from his understandable decision not to confront legal doctrine, as this Arti-
cle seeks to do. Specifically, it is difficult to see absent a functional jurisprudence how
El-Gamal's vague notions of "spirit" could be realized in practice. The dominant formal-
ists would insist that their practice is no less Islamic given its compliance with shari'a
and, absent jurisprudential reformulations, little could be said in response to such a
claim.
223. This is emphatically not the case with respect to other legal realms where some
of the Qur'an's passages do create substantial problems. These include the plainly gen-
der discriminatory verses on inheritance, see QUR'AN 4:11; the sanctioning of polygamy,
see QUR'AN 4:3; spousal abuse in certain circumstances, see QUR'AN 4:34; severe corpo-
ral punishment for consensual sexual activity, see QUR'AN 24:2; and the suggestion of
some verses, contradicted by others, to kill unbelievers wherever they might be found,
see QUR'AN 9:5. But see QUR'AN 16:126 (urging tolerance even of unbelievers who com-
mit some sort of transgression). Reform-minded methodologies have been advanced to
address these issues. See, e.g., An-Na'im, supra note 64, at 52-60 (discussing the
approach of a prominent Sudanese jurist calling for abrogation of the problematic verses
on the grounds that earlier contradictory verses speak to the fundamental dignity of all
persons and were meant to be universal, while the problematic passages related to rules
delivered to a specific society at a specific time); Bernard K. Freamon, Slavery, Freedom,
and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence, 11 HAuv. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 56-64
(1998) (arguing persuasively for a liberalized version of ijma to take precedence over
Qur'anic verses that presuppose the existence of slavery). Nevertheless, despite these
attempts, to the extent that Qur'anic maxims are not followed in Islamic nations, it is not
because of a comprehensive reexamination of the verses, but rather their replacement
with secular codes. See WEiss, supra note 35, at 188. This has led An-Na'im to advocate
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B. The Roles of Hadith, Istihsan, and Istislah: An Examination of
Sanhuri and Sadr
While significant portions of the hadith may be apocryphal, they are
generally deemed to be the utterances of the Apostle of God and, therefore,
constitute a significant part of any Islamic jurisprudence. Moreover, as
much of the ritual aspects of Islamic practice are bound to the hadith, any
attempt to divorce Islam from the hadith would so unmoor the traditional
bases of Islamic thought that the religion would be scarcely recognizable to
its adherents. 22 4
However, unlike the Qur'an, absolute compliance to the terms of the
hadith and, more importantly, their reductionist expansion through qiyas is
not possible if a sensible alternative modality is to be constructed. If hadith
prohibiting the sale of the fish in the sea and the trade of precious metals
with unilateral excess in value are not only followed but interpreted and
expanded through the doctrine of qiyas in the manner of modern Islamic
finance, then the same, or similar, problems as exist now will inevitably re-
emerge. The hadith must be taken seriously as constituent elements of
Islamic doctrine, and qiyas need not be abandoned in its entirety, but the
roles of istislah and istihsan in applying the hadith itself must be substan-
tially increased. 225 This has considerably more purchase among the Mus-
an alternative Islamic solution that might be termed secular, in which the shari'a is not
the positive law of the State. Abdullahi An-Naim, Shari'a and Positive Legislation: Is an
Islamic State Possible or Viable?, in 5 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 30-
31 (Eugene Cotran and Chibli Mallat eds., 1999). An-Na'im points out that the develop-
ment of the shari'a, with its divergent opinions among jurists in the classical era, clashes
conceptually with the manner in which positive legislation is enacted by a state. The
political organs of a state, including its legislature, cannot really be expected to select
among the various conflicting juristic rules constituting the shari'a and deem whatever
politically expedient solution emerged to be the Divine Command of God. See id. at 32-
36. An-Na'im's work is bold and noteworthy, though orthogonal to the purposes of this
Article. Even if one were to assume a total separation of positive legislation from the
shari'a, an alternative Islamic financial system functioning alongside that of the State, as
is the case in Malaysia currently, could still play a salutary role in Islamic societies and
ideas on alternative modalities would still prove useful in the context of Islamic finance.
224. See, e.g., RiSALA, supra note 70, i 535-37, 613-18 (pointing out correctly that
the hadith often provides context to Islamic ritualistic practice).
225. It should also be noted that an increasingly visible role for istislah and istihsan is
not an idea that has been invented by this author. For example, Professor John Esposito
has spoken favorably about both istihsan and istislah. See John L. Esposito, Perspectives
on Islamic Law Reform, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 217, 241-42 (1980); see also AN-
NA'IM, supra note 64, at 51 (referring to a fourteenth century jurist with similar ideas).
Moreover, much of this notion of reformulating the competing roles of qiyas, istihsan
and istislah is often subsumed under the rubric of a call for ijtihad, or independent
juristic reasoning. See, e.g., Esposito, supra note 225, at 241-42; MALLAT, supra note 17,
at 124-26 (describing Sadr's theory in terms that sound remarkably like a form of istis-
lah). This call arises from the fact that Muslim legend holds that at some point at the
end of the 12th century jurists agreed by ijma that there was no purpose to further
development of modalities and rules, and supposedly "closed the doors" of ijtihad.
COULSON, supra note 65, at 81, 202; contra Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad
Closed?, 16 INT'LJ. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 4 (1984) (suggesting that the fabled "closing of the
doors" never in fact happened). Rather than reason independently, later jurists were
expected to follow faithfully the theories of their predecessors through a process known
as taqlid. See ORIGINS, supra note 69, at 121-23 (describing the distinction between
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lim body politic than any suggestion that the Qur'an's verses be
reevaluated, and seminal jurists and legal scholars, such as Sanhuri and
Sadr, have taken ginger steps in this direction.
1. Sanhuri's Definitional Approach
Sanhuri has an alternative interpretation of the historic prohibition of
riba that is built upon both the sanctity of the Qur'an and substantial
respect for the hadith.226 For ease of reference, and because of its emphasis
on determining what the hadith are precisely supposed to mean in light of
Qur'anic verse, the author calls this approach the "definitional" approach
or theory.
Sanhuri argues that the language of the Prophetic hadith on riba al-
jahiliyya, along with a reading of the Qur'anic verses on the subject, sug-
gests that the central Qur'anic prohibition concerned only the form of riba,
where a debtor was told on the due date of his loan that he either needed to
make payment in full or the amount due would increase. 22 7 While Sanhuri
does not disregard the prohibitions in the hadith on delayed or unequal
exchanges that lead to the interest prohibition, he does suggest that they
are prohibitions of means (tahreem wasa'il), and that their purpose is to
prevent commercial actors from circumventing the central Qur'anic prohi-
bition (tahreem maqasid) of riba al-jahiliyya.2 28 Therefore, Sanhuri rea-
sons, as the prohibitions on trade are of means, they may be set aside in
cases of need (haja), unlike the central intended prohibition, which may
never be set aside. 229 Sanhuri indicates that need is a preponderance of
the public interest (al maslaha al rajiha), which in the modern era clearly
points to permitting debt. 230 Therefore, the only riba prohibition would be
on agreements to increase the value of a loan in exchange for an extension.
The argument turns the Langdellian modalities on their head. Rather
than search the hadith for the fundamental principles, Sanhuri looks first
to the Qur'an, then defines on the basis of the Qur'an and the hadith
exactly what policy the Qur'anic provision is meant to further and subse-
quently reduces the Prophetic hadith not centered on the Qur'anic prohibi-
tion to some sort of subsidiary repealable status, implicitly to be evaluated
ijtihad and taqlid). The prominent jurist Muhammad Abdu in the early part of the twen-
tieth century called for the doors of ijtihad to be reopened, and this has become a battle
cry of sorts for reform of every conceivable variety. See, e.g., COULSON, supra note 65, at
201-02; IRSHAD MANji, THE TROUBLE WITH ISLAM: A MUSLIM'S CALL FOR REFORM OF HER
FAITH 158-86 (2003) (using the term ijtihad to propose broad changes to the substance
of shari'a, including abrogation of Qur'anic verses). While the term ijtihad hardly has
any definable methodology attached to it, in the modern era, proponents of ijtihad, such
as Sadr and Abdu, generally seek an expansive use of reason to develop creative Islamic
solutions to the problems of modern society while still remaining essentially faithful to
the Qur'an and hadith. See MALLAT, supra note 17, at 124. This effectively is a reorgani-
zation of the relative priorities of istislah, istihsan, and qiyas.
226. See SANHURI, supra note 120.
227. See id. at 241-42.
228. See id. at 242.
229. See id. at 242-43.
230. See id. at 243.
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on the basis of istislah or istihsan.231 Sanhuri's definitional solution is not
entirely satisfactory, as it seems to prevent or complicate debt restructur-
ing, which is a non-exploitative practice, and does nothing to reformulate
riba in a manner that accords with contemporary notions of social justice.
However, it lays the groundwork for a possible approach that shows
promise.
Though Sanhuri does not apply his definitional theory to gharar, it
could apply equally well. The Qur'anic prohibition clearly refers to games
of chance and divination, as opposed to commercial activity, and this,
therefore, is the intended prohibition. 23 2 Prohibitions against particular
commercial uncertainties, such as the sale of a pregnant camel, are effec-
tively prohibitions of means to prevent parties from being able to circum-
vent the intended prohibition through artifice. 23 3 Therefore, the hadith
may be set aside given the need for commercial transactions involving
uncertainty. This would limit gharar so that it did not impose any substan-
tial constraints on commercial practices, but would not allow gharar to
serve any social justice function either.
2. Sadr's Contextual Approach
The Iraqi Shi'i jurist, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, is one of the founders
of Islamic economics, a staunch opponent of interest, and a highly
respected jurist, primarily among Shi'is. Sadr suggested a flexible
approach to hadith different from Sanhuri's. 23 4 Sadr's Islamist credentials
are beyond doubt, and in addition to his works on economics and bank-
ing,23 5 he is also considered to have had a role in the drafting of the Iranian
constitution. 236 Despite this, Sadr's revolutionary steps in the direction of
a liberal and anti-formalist approach to Islamic jurisprudence is an impor-
tant part of his legacy that cannot be gainsaid.2 3 7
231. Sanhuri's approach also reflects a certain civil law mentality given his crucial
role in developing the civil codes in various Middle Eastern nations. Professor Fletcher
has noted in a highly influential article that those steeped in common law culture
engage in a type of "flat" thinking that emphasizes broad notions of reasonableness,
while civilians prefer a "structured" approach wherein particular absolute rights, or in
this case prohibitions, are established, but limited and qualified by doctrine. George P.
Fletcher, The Right and The Reasonable, 98 HAnv. L. REV. 949 (1984). This certainly
seems to be the case here, as Sanhuri has established a blanket prohibition and then
created particular exceptions based on "need," while the author's immediate common
law reaction to Sanhuri's ideas turned to whether a multi-pronged balancing test con-
cerning the reasonableness of the transaction might be a better approach. In any event,
as Sanhuri and Sadr are highly influential figures in the Islamic world, the author pre-
fers to engage their ideas to develop a sensible modality rather than simply adopt a pure
flat approach with no precedent in Islamic jurisprudence.
232. See SANHURI, supra note 120.
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., Freamon, supra note 19, at 340-41 (describing Sadr's influence among
Shi'ites); MALLAT, supra note 17, at 124 (discussing his influence among Sunnis).
235. See supra note 17.
236. See Freamon, supra note 19, at 341.
237. Sadr was killed by Saddam Hussein in early April 1980, and he can hardly be
faulted with all that went wrong in Iran, or Islamic finance, after his death. See Mot-
tahedeh, supra note 72, at 31.
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One of Sadr's revolutionary proposals regarding hadith,238 which the
author shall call the "contextual" approach or theory, involved an implicit
bifurcation of Muhammad's activities conducted or advocated in speech or
action, and those he is deemed to have accepted by failing to object when
the practice was undertaken by others. 239 Sadr argues that the latter must
be evaluated in light of the circumstances in which the practice in question
arose, and that failing to do so would be to commit the grievous jurispru-
dential error of "divorc[ing]... the practice from its conditions and circum-
stances. '2 40 For example, if Muhammad said nothing when a particular
sick person drank something in his presence, then that would not make the
consumption of the particular item permissible for all time. 24 1 Study
would have to be undertaken to determine whether Muhammad was per-
mitting an exception based on an extraordinary disease, for example, or
whether other conditions rendered the implied permission exceptional
rather than general. 2 42 Sadr argues that it is impossible simply to isolate a
particular activity from the circumstances in which it arose.2 43 This is an
implicit call for istislah to play a more significant role in jurisprudence. 24 4
However, Sadr limits his theory to tacit approvals by Muhammad, not
hadith where Muhammad clearly stated his approval of a particular
activity. 24 5
As with Sanhuri, Sadr shows an unmistakable willingness to lower cer-
tain hadith from their historic role as the source of fundamental principles,
and his continued popularity notwithstanding this stance is notable.
2 46
Moreover, his hadith-limiting contextual approach is capable of significant
development if expanded to spoken hadith. The problematic manifesta-
tions of the doctrines of riba and gharar could be readily obliterated and
replaced with more appealing interpretations. However, the expanded con-
textual approach has its difficulties, among them a lack of interpretive con-
trol, which the next section addresses.
238. Sadr advocated another idea concerning hadith that is considerably more radical;
namely, that the statements made by Muhammad in his role not as Divine Apostle, but
as judge and administrator of his community, are not permanently binding on the
Islamic community. lqtisaduna, supra note 17, at 262. This idea opens entirely new
possibilities and implications respecting hadith that are far too extensive to discuss here.
239. See IQTISADUNA, supra note 17, at 370-71.
240. Id. at 370-72 (translated by author).
241. See id. at 374.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Sadr's calls for broader use of istislah are also implicit when he declares the need
to develop a jurisprudence based not only on ethics (ikhlaqiyya), but also on realism
(waqi'iyya), therefore distinguishing what he derides as Marxism developing idealistic
and fanciful rules that assume selflessness and sinlessness and disregard the condition
of human beings. See id. at 266. Sadr's assault on Marxist theory brings to mind the
ideas of another pragmatist operating in the United States, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who
famously derided the notion of law as being some sort of idealistic "brooding omnipres-
ence in the sky." Southern Pacific Company v. Marie Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
245. See IQTISADUNA, supra note 17, at 372-75.
246. See, e.g., Rodney Wilson, The Contribution of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to Con-
temporary Islamic Economic Thought, 9 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 46, 46-47 (1998).
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C. Assertion of Interpretive Control within an Alternative Modality
1. A Problem of "Subjectivity"
Professor Fazlur Rahman has expressed some concerns about pro-
posed expansive uses of istislah, noting in particular that it could lead to
the creation of undue subjectivity.24 7 Sadr echoes the criticism and clearly
struggles in Iqtisaduna to achieve a balance between the expansive form of
creative jurisprudential thinking that he deems necessary to build an
Islamic economic system, and what he calls dhatiyya, or subjectivity. 248
The concern is that the assertion of some interpretive control will devolve
into incoherence, with generalized Qur'anic verses effectively ignored or
interpreted in a way that merely suits the particular interpreter's
preferences.
Sanhuri's definitional approach manifests clear interpretive control,
though it also continues to inhibit the development of Islamic finance.
Sadr's contextual approach, if expanded to spoken hadith, is far more flexi-
ble, but could also create considerable problems regarding lack of interpre-
tive control, as every hadith would then be reopen to evaluation with the
only question of continued applicability being whether changed circum-
stances warranted it. It is difficult to see how this would not devolve into a
jurisprudence of convenience and be dismissed as such.
2. Proposed Synthesis of Definitionalism and Contextualism
However, a synthesis of the two approaches is possible. One could
apply Sanhuri's more reductive definitional method in principle, but in a
slightly modified form in instances where the Qur'an did not define any
particular practice as forbidden but rather defined a more general stan-
dard. After applying this definitional approach and reaching the logical
conclusion that Sanhuri did, the jurist could apply Sadr's contextual the-
ory to outline the prohibited practices at issue in a more contemporary
fashion.
To take the example of riba, the argument would follow Sanhuri's defi-
nitional approach and define the Qur'anic prohibition, the intended prohi-
bition, to be riba al-jahiliyya. Sanhuri originally stopped here because he
reasoned that riba in the Qur'an was defined strictly as riba al-jahiliyya,
and the Qur'anic ban could therefore not be disturbed. 24 9 However, the
argument could proceed, adopting Sadr's contextual theory that the partic-
ular intended prohibition of Muhammad's time is no longer an exploitative
practice. 250 Using a liberalized form of qiyas interspersed with istislah or
istihsan, the extended conclusion would be that the prohibited activities of
the Qur'an would no longer be the renegotiation of a debt but rather prac-
tices that are analogous to the intended prohibition in Muhammad's time
247. See Fazlur Rahman, Toward Reformulating the Methodology of Islamic Law, 12
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219, 223 (1979).
248. See IQTISADUNA, supra note 17, at 364-90.
249. See SANHURI, supra note 120, at 172-73.
250. See IQTISADUNA, supra note 17, at 40-41.
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but adapted to contemporary society.25 1 These would be situations where
a party with enormous leverage over a second party exploits that leverage
to its considerable gain and the first party's considerable loss. As for the
prohibitions of means, Sadr's contextual approach could be used to deter-
mine other practices similar to the hadith under current circumstances that
might be used as artifices to circumvent the intended prohibition. Trades
that appear massively exploitative and one-sided, without direct evidence
of excessive leverage, could be one example. This may be broad as a defini-
tional matter, but hardly creates impossibly wide interpretive parameters
over the term riba. Moreover, the synthesis promotes social justice by limit-
ing the exploitative practices of Islamic financial institutions yet still
defines those practices in a commercially practicable manner.
Gharar could be approached similarly, but with somewhat different
results. The intended prohibition, as derived under the definitional
approach, would be modern manifestations of games of chance, whose
parameters seem rather self-evident. However, in evaluating the prohibi-
tion of means under the contextual approach, it is possible to imagine cer-
tain limitations on commercial activity. The basis for the limitation would
be that the risks that certain activities entail do not justify the commercial
purposes of the enterprise, and would thereby provide a means to circum-
vent the intended prohibition. 25 2
These are simply illustrative examples; an entire modality would
require considerably further exposition and methodological rigor by an
interpretive community. However, by these examples, the author attempts
to show how an experientially driven jurisprudence, grounded in tradi-
tional Islamic doctrine, could develop sensible legal rules without devolv-
ing into either the logic-driven quasi-scientific obsessions of Langdell or
the nihilism of Critical Legal Theory.
D. Fairness and Social Justice in an Islamic Context
Given the importance to its ontology, Islamic banking is effectively
senseless unless it provides some form of social justice and fairness. As
financial institution patrons are likely Muslim, it is reasonable to assume
that whatever form of social justice the institution exhibits should have
particular Islamic characteristics. Riba and gharar, sensibly interpreted to
prohibit particularly risky or exploitative practices, are not the only doc-
trines that might be used to promote this sort of fairness and social justice
within an Islamic context, though they are among the most significant.
Banks might take the mutual form as well to ensure their adherence to
251. This type of analogy is far removed from the original form of qiyas by which a
rule was not so much modified as expanded. Nevertheless, the reasoning is analogical,
and the use of the term qiyas is intentional, attempting to reflect some sort of proposed
stability in the development of jurisprudential thought.
252. For example, this is not an unreasonable conclusion to reach with respect to day
trading. The author also emphasizes again that these rules need not be enacted as law
but rather could function as part of a voluntary financial or commercial system operat-
ing alongside a conventional one. See supra note 218.
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these new principles, as El-Gamal suggests. 2 53 In addition, given the his-
toric recognition of interest-free loans as acts of charity, Islamic banks
could also be required to devote a small portion of their portfolio towards
such loans to those in need. Islamic banks could refrain from investing
assets in Islamically prohibited industries, such as those related to alcohol
or gambling, and donate to legitimately charitable causes. Many of these
doctrines are easy to develop and achieve, the only issue being their com-
mercial practicability.
Conclusion
Islamic finance, as currently developed under the Langdellian formal-
ism that defines Islamic jurisprudence, is an intellectually bankrupt con-
struct. It has shown itself to be little more than an incoherent web of
medieval rules, a convenient and specific blindness respecting those rules
in particular contexts, and an obfuscatory set of measures intended to lend
the entire affair a patina of genuine religious legitimacy. The goal was the
creation of a fairer economic system rooted fundamentally in partnership
profit-sharing. However, Islamic finance results in a system rife with
unnecessary complexities and inconsistencies, decidedly more expensive
than its standard commercial analogues and more deceptive given its
highly exaggerated assertions of fairness, equity and, in some cases, char-
ity. This has resulted from the application of formalistic interpretive sys-
tems with alleged origins in the jurisprudential theories of Shafi'i. As with
the Langdellians in the United States, the quest for certainty, uniformity,
and clarity, without regard to changing circumstances or considerations of
policy, has led to the development of rules that simply cannot be applied
directly, or even sensibly.
While an approach towards commercial jurisprudence that draws
from more radical trends within the American Legal Realist paradigm
seems impossible in the Islamic context, an alternative modality does seem
possible, so long as it remains within particular parameters, among them a
legitimate claim to faithful adherence to Qur'anic verse, substantial respect
for the hadith, and sufficient systematization and methodological rigor to
avoid what some Islamic jurists might deem subjectivity. More work is
required to develop these ideas further.
Some may accuse the author of lifting longstanding prohibitions in the
Islamic framework merely to satisfy global commercial demand. However,
it seems clear from current experience that at some level the demands of
the marketplace will reign supreme under any modality. The only question
is whether to adopt a system that acknowledges this reality while retaining
a distinctively Islamic character infused with populist notions of social jus-
tice and fairness, or to deceive the Muslim populace with elaborate obfus-
catory measures intended to retain the form of profit-sharing while
concealing the substantive reality of debt and risk-based finance.
253. See supra note 222.

